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I. INTRODUCTION
Prior to 1993, the tax rules motivated the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice (IRS) to “hunt for goodwill.” Due to the lack of depreciation deduc-
tions for goodwill,1 business buyers typically allocated minimal
purchase price to this asset.2 Buyers instead apportioned their costs to
depreciable assets like customer lists.3 The IRS typically reallocated
significant amounts back to nondepreciable goodwill.4 In response to
all the difficult litigation,5 Congress enacted § 197 in 1993. This sec-
tion provides business buyers the same fifteen-year depreciation re-
covery on goodwill, customer lists, trademarks, patents, copyrights,
and many other intangible assets. By equalizing the treatment of
1. The term “amortization” is used sometimes instead of “depreciation” for intangi-
ble assets. As the concepts are the same, this Article uses the more popular depre-
ciation term to reference both depreciation and amortization for ease of
exposition.
2. Tax depreciation is allowed for “wasting” assets: i.e., those which lose value over
time from usage. And the tax law assumes that goodwill does not waste away
over time. I.R.C. § 167 (2012) (“There shall be allowed as a depreciation deduc-
tion a reasonable allowance for the exhaustion, wear and tear . . . .”); Treas. Reg.
§ 1.167(a)-3 (as amended in 2004) (“If an intangible asset is . . . to be of use in the
business or in the production of income for only a limited period, the length of
which can be estimated with reasonable accuracy, such an intangible asset may
be the subject of a depreciation allowance. Examples are patents and copyrights.
An intangible asset, the useful life of which is not limited, is not subject to the
allowance for depreciation. . . . No deduction for depreciation is allowable with
respect to goodwill.”).
3. In order to sustain this position, the taxpayer had to establish both the value of
the separate asset and its limited useful life. See supra note 2.
4. See, e.g., Newark Morning Ledger v. United States, 507 U.S. 546 (1993).
5. This litigation was highly contentious given the difficulties of allocating the over-
all purchase price among the various acquired assets. As discussed infra note 20,
tax law treats a business sale as a separate sale of each individual asset.
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goodwill and other related intangibles, Congress effectively circum-
vented the IRS’s unsatisfying hunt for goodwill.6
In an interesting reversal, recent regulations publicized how tax-
payers now seek goodwill. Prior to the recent regulatory and Tax Code
changes, international tax rules incentivized taxpayers to inflate
goodwill on transfers to their foreign subsidiaries.7 This flowed from a
goodwill exception to the regular gain-recognition rules on such trans-
fers.8 Recent regulations targeted this particular loophole, explaining
why the tax law should not differentiate between goodwill and other
closely related intangibles.9 But while the recent tax bill shuts down
this specific goodwill pursuit, meaningful goodwill-hunting mischief
remains fully intact in several other significant areas.
For instance, a less publicized case involved a taxpayer’s sale of its
international operations to an unrelated buyer.10 The seller claimed a
hefty goodwill allocation to boost its foreign tax credit allowance. Dif-
ferent income sourcing rules for goodwill and related assets en-
couraged this taxpayer attempt.11 And since this involves the sale of
assets to a third party, the recent change to subsidiary transfers does
not impact this goodwill incentive.
The Internal Revenue Code (the Code) likewise incentivizes busi-
ness sellers to allocate more towards goodwill in order to maximize
income taxed at favorable capital gains rates. For instance, § 1253 de-
nies the lower capital gains rates to contingent payments for trade-
marks (and franchises) but not for goodwill and other intangibles. In
addition, even fixed-payment sales can trigger goodwill-hunting op-
portunities due to specialized capital gains rules applicable solely to
select types of intellectual property (i.e., copyrights and patents).12
These varying capital gains rules for business sellers ignore the
lessons of the recent regulations and § 197. This Article thus proposes
several corrections to the ongoing goodwill difficulties. As developed in
the roadmap below, the foreign sourcing of intangibles gains should be
keyed to the foreign taxation of such gains rather than the presence of
6. See infra section II.A.
7. See infra section III.A.
8. See infra section II.A.
9. See infra Section III.A.
10. For further discussion of International Multifoods v. Commissioner, 108 T.C. 25
(1997), see infra section II.B.
11. Section 865(d)(3) provides favorable foreign sourcing to goodwill, while
§ 865(d)(2) provides disfavored U.S. sourcing to other intangibles. Compare I.R.C.
§ 865(d)(3) (2012), with id. § 856(d)(2). And as discussed infra notes 66–74 and
accompanying text, foreign-source income from a goodwill allocation increases
the allowable foreign tax credits as an offset to the U.S. tax liability.
12. On the one hand, § 1235 provides taxpayer-friendly rules for capital gains to pat-
ent inventors. In the other direction, § 1221(a)(3) provides a taxpayer-unfriendly
rule which denies capital gains to copyright developers. For a fuller discussion,
see infra notes 117–19 and accompanying text.
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goodwill. Next, § 1253 should eliminate trademarks from its coverage.
Third, similar to the § 197 rules for buyers, uniform capital gains
rules should apply to business sellers regardless of the nature of the
intangible assets.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II chronicles how the govern-
ment’s goodwill-hunting efforts prior to 1993 culminated in the enact-
ment of § 197. In addition to providing useful background information,
this Part also presents two illustrative examples based on former
Baseball Commissioner Bud Selig’s actual tax case.
Part III then further utilizes these examples to illustrate the boun-
tiful goodwill-hunting opportunities for taxpayers. As discussed above,
this role reversal flows from the differential tax-favored treatment of
goodwill in the subsidiary transfer, foreign tax credit, and capital
gains areas.
After Part III’s exposition of current law’s problematic areas, Part
IV presents incisive solutions for each area.13 Section IV.A first ad-
dresses the goodwill sourcing problem under current § 865. Goodwill
currently operates as a poor proxy for the ultimate target: foreign tax-
ation of the intangibles gain. In addition to the valuation difficulties
highlighted above, goodwill does not accurately capture the desired
foreign taxation even in theory.14 Fortunately, an existing treaty-
sourcing provision provides the pathway for reform: link the taxpayer-
desired foreign sourcing to the actual foreign taxation of the in-
tangibles gain.15 Drawing upon this proven approach should counter-
act the usual status quo bias against untested reforms.16
Section IV.B next tackles the problematic inclusion of trademarks
in § 1253 (along with franchises).17 This encourages taxpayers to allo-
cate contingent payments away from trademarks and towards good-
will. Section 1253 should be scaled back to apply only to franchises for
several reasons. As a starting point, the legislative history reflects
congressional concern primarily over franchises, with trademarks ad-
ded more as an afterthought. In addition, trademarks raise real prac-
13. Since each area operates separately, some or all of the proposals could be
implemented.
14. See infra notes 135–36 and accompanying text.
15. The treaty rules also incorporate a separate foreign-tax-credit limitation to avoid
manipulations in the case of low foreign tax rates. See infra notes 139–40 and
accompanying text.
16. See, e.g., Wolfgang Alschner, The Impact of Investment Arbitration on Investment
Treaty Design: Myth Versus Reality, 42 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 51 (2017)
(“[I]nvestment law suffers from status quo bias: path dependency dominates over
prolific innovation. Treaty design evolution, where it takes place, consists of
states opting into and refining tried and tested language rather than trying out
something new. This path dependency prevents more radical change, even where
this change may be on balance beneficial.”).
17. Section 1253 also covers trade names in addition to trademarks and franchises.
For ease of exposition, the textual reference to trademarks includes trade names.
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tical issues avoided in the franchise context. For instance, franchises
typically subsume all the business goodwill, thereby minimizing the
problematic allocation issues.18
Finally, section IV.C addresses the other relevant capital gains
provisions for business sellers. In particular, § 1235 facilitates capital
gains for certain patents, while § 1221(a)(3) denies capital gains for
certain copyrights. Interestingly, this mixture of favorable and unde-
sired rules presents the inverse sellers’ side to the buyers’ difficulties
prior to § 197. Such recognition suggests the comparable fix here: ap-
plication of standardized rules to all transferred intangibles upon the
sale of a business.19
II. GOVERNMENT GOODWILL HUNTING BEFORE 1993
As background, this Part explores the government’s goodwill-hunt-
ing quest prior to the 1993 adoption of § 197. Taxpayers generally
minimized goodwill allocations on business acquisitions prior to 1993
in order to increase their depreciation deductions. By providing the
same fifteen-year depreciation period for all covered intangibles, the
1993 enactment of § 197 alleviated pressure on goodwill allocations.
After section II.A expands upon this general description, section II.B
provides two illustrative examples.
A. General Description of Pre-1993 Dynamic and § 197
When a taxpayer purchases a business, the taxpayer must allocate
the purchase price among all the acquired assets.20 This allows sepa-
rate determinations of depreciation for each acquired asset as well as
any gain (or loss) on the subsequent sale of any acquired asset. From
an incentives standpoint, buyers generally prefer to allocate more
purchase price to depreciable assets, especially ones with relatively
18. As discussed infra notes 165–69 and accompanying text, further issues support
this proposed deletion of trademarks from § 1253. In contrast to franchises,
§ 1253 now presents a very unbalanced approach to the two sides of the trade-
mark transaction, which further incentivizes taxpayer goodwill allocations. Link-
ing to the textual legislative history point, this also raises questions regarding
the propriety of such taxpayer-adverse rules.
19. As discussed infra note 30 and accompanying text, § 197 applies most strongly in
the context of a trade or business context. For instance, § 197 does not apply to
certain separately acquired assets. I.R.C. § 197(e)(4) (2012).
20. I.R.C. § 1060(a) (2012) (“In the case of any applicable asset acquisition, for pur-
poses of determining both—(1) the transferee’s basis in such assets, and (2) the
gain or loss of the transferor with respect to such acquisition, the consideration
received for such assets shall be allocated among such assets acquired in such
acquisition . . . .”). The § 1060 approach is consistent with the classic Williams v
McGowan case, which held that the sale of a business should be treated as the
sale of the underlying assets rather than the sale of a single “capital asset” busi-
ness. 152 F.2d 570, 572 (2d Cir. 1945).
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short depreciation periods.21 This allows faster depreciation deduc-
tions, which reduces the reportable income (and tax payments) in the
short term. Such quicker cost recovery generally benefits taxpayers
under time-value-of-money principles. As evidenced by the short ex-
ample right below, earlier tax savings benefit taxpayers through re-
ducing their interest expense in the interim period.22
Assume that Bob Buyer pays tax at a constant 50% rate each year
and buys a $1,000,000 asset. With a five-year depreciation period, Bob
will save $100,000 tax in each of the next five years.23 A longer ten-
year period reduces Bob’s annual tax savings to just $50,000.24 In this
case, Bob would recoup the initial annual $50,000 shortfall through an
additional $50,000 savings in years six through ten. But the shorter
five-year period allows a greater reduction to Bob’s borrowings in the
early years, thereby reducing his interest expense.25 Finally, a nonde-
preciable asset generally would provide even worse treatment as its
cost does not generate any depreciation deductions at all. Rather, the
purchase price serves only as an offset against sales proceeds on a
subsequent sale.26
On the other hand, the government generally benefits from the
delayed recovery of acquisition costs. Such cost-recovery deferral gen-
erates earlier tax collections, with the corollary reduction of govern-
mental interest expense in the interim. As such, prior to 1993, the
government often allocated significant purchase price to nondeprecia-
ble goodwill. As noted above, any allocable goodwill cost served solely
to offset sales proceeds on a subsequent sale in the future. As a quick
21. Section 167 looks to the actual useful life for the cost recovery period for intangi-
ble assets. See supra note 2. In contrast, § 168 provides special recovery periods
for tangible assets, which can deviate from the actual useful lives. I.R.C.
§ 168(a)(2), (c) (2012).
22. And if the taxpayer already does not need to borrow at all, the tax savings could
be invested in the interim period, generating interest income. As this assumes
constant tax rates, note that a meaningful tax rate increase in the later year(s)
could reverse the results such that an earlier payment would be more advanta-
geous notwithstanding the time value of money.
23. The amount of $1,000,000 total cost recovered evenly over five years equals a
$200,000 depreciation deduction each year. And a $200,000 depreciation deduc-
tion each year would save the taxpayer $100,000 of taxes each year given the
taxpayer’s constant 50% tax rate. Hence, $200,000 reduced income (via the de-
duction) times the 50% rate equals $100,000.
24. The amount of $1,000,000 total cost recovered evenly over ten years equals a
$100,000 depreciation deduction each year. And a $100,000 depreciation deduc-
tion each year would save the taxpayer $50,000 of taxes each year given the tax-
payer’s constant 50% tax rate. Hence, $100,000 reduced income (via the
deduction) times the 50% rate equals $50,000.
25. Again, if they do not have interest expense, they can then invest the savings in
the interim period and receive interest income.
26. As a technical matter, the taxpayer receives a cost “basis” in the asset. I.R.C.
§ 1012 (2012). And when the asset is sold, such basis offsets the “amount real-
ized.” I.R.C. § 1001 (2012).
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aside, note that the government similarly benefited from allocations to
going concern value. While goodwill and going concern value closely
relate, the court in Canterbury v. Commissioner distinguished the two
concepts as follows: goodwill captures the “business reputation and
the strength of customer loyalty,” while going concern value reflects
more “the operating relationship of assets and personnel inherent in
an ongoing business.”27
These conflicting incentives lead to tremendous litigation over the
years, with taxpayers claiming over a hundred different intangible as-
sets separate from goodwill and going concern value.28 In response to
all protracted litigation and difficulties in resolving the thorny good-
will-related issues, Congress enacted § 197 in 1993.29 On the acquisi-
tion of a trade or business,30 most acquired intangibles now qualify for
fifteen-year depreciation regardless of their actual useful life. The cov-
ered § 197 intangibles importantly include not only goodwill and going
concern value but many other goodwill-related assets like trademarks,
franchises, and patents.31 As such, § 197 has largely rendered moot
the thorny buyer-side allocation issues between goodwill and related
intangible assets.32
Finally, note the comparable treatment of goodwill, franchise, and
trademark costs to buyers even before the adoption of § 197. Trade-
mark and franchise costs also generally failed to generate any depreci-
ation prior to § 197 given the lack of a defined useful life. As such,
27. See Canterbury v. Comm’r, 99 T.C. 223, 252 (1992).
28. This is reflected in the preamble to the recent § 367 regulations. See Treatment of
Certain Transfers of Property to Foreign Corporations, 81 Fed. Reg. 91,012,
91,014–15 (Dec. 16, 2016).
29. Id. For additional background discussion, see Mary LaFrance, Days of Our Lives:
The Impact of Section 197 on the Depreciation of Copyrights, Patents and Related
Property, 24 HOFSTRA L. REV. 317, 321–24 (1995).
30. While § 197 can apply to certain assets acquired separately apart from a trade or
business, separately acquired patents and copyrights fall outside § 197. See I.R.C.
§ 197(e)(4) (2012).
31. For a fuller listing of § 197 intangibles, see infra notes 98–100 and accompanying
text.
32. The loss-disallowance rule of § 197(f) provides protection for the government.
Without a loss-disallowance rule, taxpayers would have an incentive to allocate
extra basis to intangibles they plan to sell shortly after the acquisition in order to
then claim a loss on such sale. Section 197(f) neatly blocks that incentive by disal-
lowing any such claimed loss (and reallocating the basis to the other retained
intangible assets). Some smaller planning opportunities nonetheless remain,
though, including the incentive to: (1) allocate more to assets which might be sold
off separately to protect against gain on such subsequent sale (if the asset does
not lose value as quickly as the § 197 depreciation) and (2) allocate less to capital
assets which might be sold off separately to generate extra low-rate capital gains,
with extra basis on the remaining intangibles generating ordinary-rate deduc-
tions over time.
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taxpayers generally did not allocate purchase price away from good-
will and towards trademarks or franchises.33
B. Two Illustrative Examples
To illustrate the above points, consider the following two examples.
1. Example 1: Former Baseball Commissioner Bud Selig’s Tax
Case
Consider Bud’s 1970 purchase of the Brewers baseball team before
his stint as Baseball Commissioner.34 Bud allocated almost ninety-
five percent of the $10,800,000 purchase price to player contracts with
a five-year depreciation period.35 Bud allocated a much smaller five
percent to the baseball’s team’s nondepreciable franchise.36 The gov-
ernment challenged the low franchise percentage, but the court up-
held Bud’s allocation.
Consider now the key takeaways from this classic case. First, and
most importantly, § 197 now neatly resolves the litigated issue as
costs for either the player contracts or the franchise qualify for the
same fifteen-year depreciation. In addition, § 197 also preserves the
prior neutrality between the previously nondepreciable assets like
goodwill, going concern value, and trademarks.37 Now, however, all
those assets likewise receive the same fifteen-year depreciation as
33. There were some exceptions to this general rule. See, for example, the discussion
of the original § 1253(d) prior to amendment infra notes 165–69 and accompany-
ing text. See also Herrick v. Comm’r, 85 T.C. 237, 266 (1985) (“Prior to the enact-
ment of section 1253(d)(2) . . . [t]he deductibility or amortization of payments in
connection with the acquisition of franchises depended upon whether the
franchise had a reasonably determinable useful life.” (citations omitted)); S. REP.
NO. 91-552, at 208, 210 (1969), as reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2027, 2242,
2245 (“Under present law, amounts paid (initial fees or contingent payments) to
acquire a franchise, trademark, or trade name may not be deducted by the trans-
feree through depreciation or amortization, since franchises, trademarks, and
trade names are considered to be intangible assets with unascertainable useful
lives. . . . Of course, the franchise, trademark, or trade name may have an ascer-
tainable life in the circumstances of a particular case.).
34. Selig v. United States, 740 F.2d 572 (7th Cir. 1984). At the time of acquisition,
the team was based in Seattle (and named the Pilots). Id. at 574–75.
35. This amount would be $10,200,000 of the $10,800,000. Id. at 575.
36. A sum of $500,000 of the $10,800,000 was allocated to the franchise. The remain-
ing $100,000 (a relatively insignificant one percent) was allocated to tangible as-
sets such as equipment. Id.
37. As discussed infra notes 165–69 and accompanying text, § 1253(d) provided two
possible deduction scenarios for trademarks prior to amendment in connection
with the 1993 enactment of § 197. Neither scenario would have been applicable
on these facts. As discussed infra notes 157–61, the two categories involved either
the retention of a significant right or contingent payments.
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player contracts (and franchises).38 So just like the actual case, there
is no need to undertake possible tricky distinctions between
franchise,39 goodwill, going concern value, and trademarks.40
To develop a fuller range of issues,41 the next example extends
Bud’s actual tax case to a fictional restaurant and brewery.
2. Example 2: Sale of Bud’s Bar & Grill
Assume now that Bud financed his Brewers acquisition by selling
his restaurant and brewery, named Bud’s Bar & Grill. In addition to
tangible real estate and inventory, Bud’s Bar & Grill owns the follow-
ing intangible assets: (1) trademarks on several varieties of home
brews;42 (2) copyrights on menus, a monthly newsletter, a website,
and a restaurant recipe book;43 (3) patents on certain recipes; (4) cer-
38. I.R.C. § 197(d)(1)(A) (2012) (“goodwill”); id. § 197(d)(1)(B) (“going concern value”);
id. § 197(d)(1)(C)(i) (“workforce in place including its composition and terms and
conditions (contractual or otherwise) of its employment”); id. § 197(d)(1)(F)
(“franchise, trademark”). In addition, note that subsequent contingent payments
are depreciated over the remaining years on the original fifteen-year timetable.
Treas. Reg. § 1.197-2(f)(2) (2013).
39. For an analysis of whether goodwill can be separated from a franchise, see infra
notes 79–81 and accompanying text.
40. While the actual case did not mention any trademarks, a current sale of the
Brewers would involve some trademark value, such as for the “BrewCrew” moni-
ker. See Brew Crew, TRADEMARKIA, http://www.trademarkia.com/brew-crew-
77493165.html [http://perma.unl.edu/7N8X-AYQV].
41. This example removes the franchise aspect, which will be particularly helpful for
Part III. As developed therein, franchises can dodge certain issues by subsuming
all the business goodwill. See infra notes 79–81 and accompanying text. For ac-
tual cases dealing with breweries see, for example, Seattle Brewing & Malting
Co. v. Commissioner, 6 T.C. 856, 868, 873 (1946) (holding that the grant of trade
name for a limited geographic region constituted a sale for tax purposes), and
Clarke v. Haberle Crystal Springs Brewing Co., 280 U.S. 384 (1930) (denying tax-
payer loss of goodwill deduction upon prohibition).
42. See, for example, BJ’S RESTAURANTS, INC., FORM 10-K (2013), https://www.sec
.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1013488/000119312513074282/d447638d10k.htm#toc44
7638_24 [https://perma.unl.edu/G8TS-C5SL], for a sample of a restaurant’s
trademarks:
Our domestically-registered trademarks and service marks include,
among others, the word mark “BJ’s Chicago Pizzeria,” and our stylized
logo, displaying the name “BJ’s.” In addition, among others, we have reg-
istered the word marks “BJ’s Restaurant & Brewery,” “BJ’s Restaurant
& Brewhouse” and “BJ’s Pizza & Grill” for our restaurant services; “Har-
vest Hefeweizen,” “BJ’s Jeremiah Red,” “BJ’s P.M. Porter,” “Brewhouse
Blonde,” “Owen’s IPA,” “Pooks,” “Piranha,” “NitWit,” “Nutty Brewnette,”
“Tatonka” and “Berry Burst Cider” for our proprietary beers . . . .“Har-
vest Hefeweizen,” “BJ’s Jeremiah Red,” “BJ’s P.M. Porter,” “Brewhouse
Blonde,” “Owen’s IPA,” “Pooks,” “Piranha,” “NitWit,” “Nutty Brewnette,”
“Tatonka” and “Berry Burst Cider” for our proprietary beers.”
43. For a discussion of possible copyright on a recipe book, see Betty Wang, Can You
Copyright a Recipe?, FINDLAW (June 7, 2013), http://blogs.findlaw.com/law_and_
life/2013/06/can-you-copyright-a-recipe.html [http://perma.unl.edu/GC5M-
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tain unpatented recipes protected as trade secrets;44 (5) customer lists
for the monthly newsletter;45 and (6) unspecified goodwill and going
concern value.46 Buddy Buyer pays $10,800,000 for Bud’s Bar &
Grill’s assets.
Consider now the key takeaway from this more robust example.
Prior to § 197, Buddy Buyer would have had an incentive to allocate
away from goodwill and towards a number of other assets, such as the
customer lists, patents, or copyrights (all of which qualified for depre-
ciation prior to § 197).47 There would be a further incentive to allocate
towards assets with shorter lives than longer lives, such as more to
the patent and less to the copyright.48 Once again, though, § 197
neatly resolves all these allocation difficulties as each of the acquired
intangibles now qualifies for the same fifteen-year depreciation.49
C. Summary
In sum, § 197’s very broad coverage now generally negates the
need to separate out short-lived intangible assets from goodwill. Sec-
tion 197 also preserves the general lack of any need to separate out
goodwill from trademarks and franchise value.50 But as Part III dem-
onstrates, these thorny issues remain when the focus shifts from the
buyer to the seller. As developed therein, several other Code sections
QBFR]. And for a restaurant example, see JUDY RODGERS, THE ZUNI CAFE COOK-
BOOK: A COMPENDIUM OF RECIPES AND COOKING LESSONS FROM SAN FRANCISCO’S
BELOVED RESTAURANT (2002).
44. For the ability to protect certain recipes under patent law (and the more general
trade secret possibility), see Can Recipes Be Patented?, INVENTORS EYE (June
2013), https://www.uspto.gov/custom-page/inventors-eye-advice-1 [http://perma
.unl.edu/7KL6-7AQX].
45. For a restaurant’s balance sheet showing various intangibles, including customer
lists, trademarks, and goodwill, see, for example, LANDRY’S RESTAURANTS, INC.,
FORM 10-K (2011), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/908652/0001193125
11068593/d10k.htm [https://perma.unl.edu/PJ7N-8J4R].
46. For a restaurant’s balance sheet showing goodwill, see, for example, id.
47. Similar to the player contracts in the actual Bud Selig case, there also would be
an incentive to allocate to workforce in place. There would be a further incentive
to allocate towards assets with shorter lives than longer lives. See supra text
accompanying notes 23–26.
48. Patents generally have a shorter useful life than copyrights given the shorter
legal time of protection. See, e.g., Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen & Jeffrey A. Maine, Tax-
ing the New Intellectual Property Right, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 13 (2004).
49. I.R.C. § 197(d)(1)(A) (2012) (“goodwill”); id. § 197(d)(1)(B) (“going concern value”);
id. § 197(C)(iii) (“any patent, copyright, formula, process, design, pattern, know-
how, format, or other similar item”); id. § 197(d)(1)(C)(iv) (“any customer-based
intangible”); id. § 197(d)(1)(F) (“trademark”).
50. If anything, § 197 actually further cleaned up this area and provided some poten-
tial exceptions to the general lack of depreciation for franchises and trademarks.
See supra note 33.
2018] GOODWILL HUNTING GONE BAD 893
interestingly encourage selling taxpayers to allocate consideration to-
wards goodwill.51
III. GOODWILL HUNTING GONE BAD:
TAXPAYERS NOW HUNT
As highlighted above, § 197 generally negates the buyer’s incentive
to downplay goodwill.52 But as discussed in this Part, other Code sec-
tions perversely incentivize taxpayers to overstate goodwill. Recent
regulations highlight such opportunistic behavior by U.S. corporations
on transfers to foreign subsidiaries.53 While the recent tax bill shuts
this down, Section III.A will explore these subsidiary transfers since
the lessons from these related-party transfers link to similar, unad-
dressed incentives on business sales to unrelated third parties. Sec-
tions III.B and III.C demonstrate such linkage as regards foreign tax
credits and lower capital gains rates, respectively.54
A. Goodwill Hunting on Transfers to Foreign Subsidiaries
As background, consider first a brief description of §§ 351 and 367.
Section 351 generally allows tax-free transfers of appreciated property
to domestic subsidiaries since a fully taxable U.S. company continues
to hold the transferred assets.55 In contrast, § 367(a) generally over-
rides this tax-free result for transfers to foreign subsidiaries since the
assets are no longer held by a fully taxable U.S. company.56 Section
367(a) contains a tax-free exception for qualified “active trade or busi-
ness” property.57 If such exception does not apply, § 367(a) generally
requires a single payment keyed to the transferred assets’ value.58
But due to the difficulty in valuing intangible assets, § 367(d) imposes
instead an annual deemed royalty on enumerated intangibles keyed to
the actual profits over time (a so-called super royalty).59
51. References to “goodwill” include both goodwill and the closely related going con-
cern value.
52. See supra section II.A.
53. See, e.g., Treatment of Certain Transfers of Property to Foreign Corporations, 81
Fed. Reg. 91,012, 91,014–15 (Dec. 16, 2016).
54. As developed in section III.B, the specific international issue involves foreign tax
credits. Section III.C considers more general capital gain provisions, which can be
applicable to either domestic or international sales.
55. As discussed infra note 66, the recent tax bill created a new “territories” system
for domestic corporations and foreign subsidiaries.
56. While repatriations from the foreign subsidiary would face U.S. tax, concern over
indefinite deferrals of tax lead to this section. See supra text accompanying notes
23–26.
57. I.R.C. § 367(a)(3) (2012).
58. More technically, the taxed gain would equal the asset’s value less its basis.
I.R.C. § 1001 (2012).
59. Note that § 367(d) was first added in 1984 with just a regular deemed royalty.
The super royalty aspect was added in 1986. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXA-
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Consider next the § 367 connection to goodwill hunting.60 Section
367(d) defines the covered intangibles by cross-reference to § 936(h).
Prior to the recent tax bill, § 936(h) did not explicitly reference good-
will. In addition, consistent with the legislative history, the initial
1986 regulations excluded goodwill from § 367(a) and (d).61 Linking
back to Part II, the preamble to the current § 367 regulations explain
how
taxpayers have reversed their positions regarding the significance of goodwill
and going concern value in response to the enactment of sections 197 and
367(d), and now commonly assert that such value constitutes a large percent-
age—even the vast majority—of an enterprise’s value [in order to avoid gain
recognition under § 367].62
To illustrate, recall the earlier second example involving Bud’s Bar
& Grill.63 This sale involved a number of intangible assets: trade-
marks, copyrights, patents, trade secrets, customer lists, and genera-
lized goodwill. Assume now that Bud had a second London restaurant
and decided to transfer his overseas operations to a U.K. subsidiary.
As § 367(d) explicitly included all the intangibles other than goodwill
TION, 99TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, at
1013–16 (Comm. Print 1987) (“There was a strong incentive for taxpayers to
transfer intangibles to related foreign corporations . . . in a low tax jurisdiction,
particularly when the intangible has a high value relative to manufacturing or
assembly costs. Such transfers could result in indefinite tax deferral or effective
tax exemption on the earnings, while retaining the value of the earnings in the
related group. . . . In making this change [to the super royalty], Congress in-
tended to make it clear that industry norms or other unrelated party transactions
do not provide a safe-harbor payment for related party intangibles transfers.
Where taxpayers transfer intangibles with a high profit potential, the compensa-
tion for the intangibles should be greater than industry averages or norms. . . .
Congress did not intend however that the inquiry as to the appropriate compen-
sation for the intangible be limited to the question of whether it was appropriate
considering only the facts in existence at the time of the transfer. Congress in-
tended that consideration also be given to the actual profit experience realized as
a consequence of the transfer. Thus Congress intended to require that the pay-
ments made for the intangible be adjusted over time to reflect changes in the
income attributable to the intangible. The act is not intended to require annual
adjustments when there are only minor variations in revenues. However, it will
not be sufficient to consider only the evidence of value at the time of the transfer.
Adjustments will be required when there are major variations in the annual
amounts of revenue attributable to the intangible.”).
60. For another commentator’s use of “goodwill hunting,” see, for example, Brett
Wells, Revisiting Section 367(d): How Treasury Took the Bite Out of Section
367(d) and What Should Be Done About It, 16 FLA. TAX REV. 519, 523 (2014)
(“THE GOODWILL HUNTING EXERCISE CAUSED US TO LOSE FOCUS ON SECTION
367(d)’s OBJECTIVE”).
61. See, e.g., Treatment of Certain Transfers of Property to Foreign Corporations, 81
Fed. Reg. 91,012, 91,013–14 (Dec. 16, 2016).
62. Id. at 91,015.
63. See supra subsection II.B.2. As will be explained more fully in the next section, I
utilize the second example since the franchise aspect in the first example might
negate any severable goodwill. See, e.g., infra note 81 and accompanying text.
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prior to the recent change, Bud might have attempted a significant
goodwill allocation instead.
The recent tax bill expanded the intangibles definition to include
goodwill and going concern value.64 These § 367 difficulties nonethe-
less remain instructive given the linkage to goodwill incentives in
comparable contexts. In this regard, consider the following key lan-
guage from the current regulation’s preamble:
The IRS’s experience administering section 367(d) has, once again, high-
lighted the abuse potential that arises from the need to distinguish value at-
tributable to nominally distinct intangibles that are used together in a single
trade or business. Specifically, the uncertainty inherent in distinguishing be-
tween value attributable to goodwill and going concern value and value attrib-
utable to other intangible property makes any exception to income recognition
for the outbound transfer of goodwill and going concern value unduly difficult
to administer and prone to tax avoidance. Of course, any rule that provides for
the tax-free transfer of one type of property, while the transfer of other types
of property remains taxable, provides an incentive to improperly allocate
value away from the taxable property and onto the tax-free property. This
problem is acute, however, in cases involving the offshore reorganization of en-
tire business divisions that include high-value, interrelated intangibles, be-
cause goodwill and going concern value are particularly difficult to distinguish
(perhaps are even indistinguishable) from the enumerated section 936
intangibles.65
B. Goodwill Hunting for Foreign Tax Credits
As background, consider first the linkage of foreign tax credits to
income sourcing (U.S. versus foreign). Even though the United States
generally taxes all income of U.S. taxpayers,66 sourcing can impact
the final tax bill due to foreign income tax credits. To alleviate the
double taxation of foreign-source income, § 904(a) allows U.S. taxpay-
ers a foreign-income tax credit against their U.S. tax, subject to the
following limitation: “The total amount of the credit . . . shall not ex-
ceed the same proportion of the tax against which such credit is taken
which the taxpayer’s taxable income from sources without the United
64. Section 14221 of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act revised part (vi) of the cross-refer-
enced § 936(h)(3)(B). Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 14221, 131 Stat. 2054, 2218 (to be codi-
fied in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). Note that a prior version of this article
(drafted before the tax bill) proposed such a change.
65. See, e.g., Treatment of Certain Transfers of Property to Foreign Corporations, 81
Fed. Reg. 91,012, 91,015 (Dec. 16, 2016) (emphasis added).
66. The recent tax bill created a new “territorial” system, subject to exceptions, for
foreign corporations and certain foreign subsidiaries. To the extent applicable,
this would negate this area of foreign tax credits. A fuller discussion of this new
system is well beyond the limited scope of this paper. See I.R.C. § 245A (Supp.
2017), added by section 14101 of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act. In contrast, foreign
taxpayers are taxed only on their U.S.-source income. I.R.C. §§ 871(a), 881(a)
(2012).
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States bears to his entire taxable income for the same taxable year.”67
As illustrated right below, additional foreign-source income therefore
increases the allowable credit.
To illustrate, assume a corporate taxpayer reports $1,000,000 of
net income and paid $340,000 foreign income tax. Before the foreign
tax credit, the U.S. tax liability equals $340,000 (determined at the
34% general corporate rate).68 Assuming all foreign-source income,
the corporation can fully use its foreign tax payments to avoid any
U.S. tax payments.69 With any U.S.-source income, however, the cor-
poration cannot use all its foreign taxes paid as an offset. Assume, for
instance, an equal split of U.S.- and foreign-source income. This would
reduce the usable tax credit to just $170,000 (i.e., half the tax bill),70
leaving $170,000 payable to the U.S. government.71
Consider next the sourcing rules for gain on the sale of intangibles
by a U.S. taxpayer. Gains from covered intangible assets generally are
sourced to the United States.72 Section 865(d)(2) defines such in-
tangibles as “any patent, copyright, secret process or formula, good-
will, trademark, trade brand, franchise, or other like property.”73
Section 865(d)(3), however, provides a special rule sourcing gain from
the sale of goodwill to the country of origination.74 This special rule
eerily resembles the now-discredited § 367 exemption for goodwill. By
likewise providing more beneficial treatment to goodwill, § 865(d)(3)
encourages U.S. business sellers to boost goodwill allocations. If sus-
67. I.R.C. § 904(a) (2012). Note that there are more specific limitations, such as for
passive income. See I.R.C. § 904(d)(1)(A) (2012). Specific limitations will be dis-
cussed in greater detail infra notes 139–42 and accompanying text.
68. See I.R.C. § 11 (2012).
69. If so, the allowable percentage would equal 100% ($1,000,000 foreign source di-
vided by $1,000,000 total income). One hundred percent times the $340,000 U.S.
tax (determined without regard to the credit) equals an allowable credit of
$340,000. An allowable credit of $340,000 would bring the final U.S. tax payment
down to zero: $340,000 initial payment less the allowable credit of $340,000
equals zero.
70. This would reduce the allowable percentage to 50% ($500,000 foreign source di-
vided by $1,000,000 total income). Fifty percent times the $340,000 U.S. tax (de-
termined without regard to the credit) equals an allowable credit of $170,000.
71. This would equal $340,000 initial tax less the $170,000 credit.
72. Section 865 states that income is sourced at the seller’s residence (i.e., the U.S.
for a U.S. taxpayer). I.R.C. § 865(a), (d)(2) (2012). There are two key exceptions to
this general rule. First, payments “contingent on the productivity, use, or disposi-
tion of the intangible” are sourced to where the intangibles are used (the same as
royalties). Id. §§ 865(d)(1)(A)–(B), 861(a)(4), 862(a)(4). Second, to the extent that
prior depreciation was taken on the intangible asset, gain is sourced to where the
prior depreciation was taken. § 865(c)(1), (d)(4)(A).
73. § 865(a).
74. Again, this assumes that the payments are not contingent. §§ 865(d)(1)(B),
861(a)(4), 862(a)(4). The special depreciation rules do not seem to apply to good-
will covered by § 865(d)(1), (3).
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tainable, such allocation increases the reported foreign-source income
and hence the allowable foreign tax credits.
The International Multifoods Corp. v. Commissioner case75 neatly
illustrates the goodwill-hunting quest. It also provides some necessary
judicial gloss on the statute given the confusing inclusion of goodwill
in both § 865(d)(2) and (d)(3), as described above. In the case, the U.S.
taxpayer sold its Asian and Pacific operations of the Mister Donut
franchise chain, including all existing franchise agreements, trade-
marks, secret formulas, processes, supplier agreements, etc. (essen-
tially the entire “Mr. Donut System” for that area).76 With an eye on
its foreign tax credit, the taxpayer allocated 54% of the roughly
$2,000,000 sales price to goodwill, another 40% to a noncompete cove-
nant (likewise sourced as foreign77), with only 6% to the U.S.-sourced
trademarks. The following language from a memo prepared by the
taxpayer’s employee captures the essence of the problem:
In negotiating the allocation it is important to note that the amounts allo-
cated to goodwill and the noncompete covenant, to the extent upheld upon IRS
audit, will be tax-free [due to foreign tax credits]. The amount allocated to the
trademarks and pending trademark applications will be subject to a tax of
approximately 38% in the U.S. and potentially additional taxes in the coun-
tries in which such trademarks are registered. Therefore, to the extent that
we can maximize the allocation to the goodwill and non-compete covenant, we
will maximize Multifoods’ after-tax gain on the sale.78
The tax court shut down this particular goodwill-hunting attempt,
relying heavily upon the franchise aspect of the case.79 In particular,
75. 108 T.C. 25 (1997).
76. Id. The franchise agreements described the “Mister Donut System” as:
[T]he name “Mister Donut”, a unique and readily recognizable de-
sign, color scheme and layout for the premises wherein such business is
conducted (herein called a “Mister Donut Shop”) and for its furnishings,
signs, emblems, trade names, trademarks, certification marks and ser-
vice marks . . . , all of which may be changed, improved and further de-
veloped from time to time . . . .
The Mister Donut System also included methods of preparation, serv-
ing and merchandising doughnuts, pastries, and other food products,
and the use of specially prepared doughnut, pastry, and other food prod-
uct mixes as may be changed, improved, and disclosed to persons
franchised by petitioner to operate a Mister Donut shop.
Id. at 28.
77. Id. at 48 (“[The government] concedes that the amount allocable to the covenant
not to compete constitutes foreign source income . . . .”).
78. Id. at 35.
79. Importantly, while the court focused at times on the goodwill associated with the
trademarks, the quoted language in the text highlights the key centrality of the
broader franchising system. Separately, the court also emphasized the inclusion
of goodwill in § 865(d)(2) as well as § 865(d)(3):
[W]e believe that Congress’ enumeration of goodwill in section 865(d)(2)
as a separate intangible asset necessarily indicates that the special
sourcing rule contained in section 865(d)(3) is applicable only where
goodwill is separate from the other intangible assets that are specifically
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the broader franchise subsumed any and all of the business goodwill,
thereby negating any stand-alone foreign-source goodwill:
Petitioner transferred . . . all its rights to exclusive use in the designated
Asian and Pacific territories of its secret formulas, processes, trade-marks,
and supplier agreements; i.e., its entire Mister Donut System. . . .
. . . .
While there are no cases on point under section 865, case law interpreting
other provisions of the Code supports respondent’s position. In Canterbury v.
Commissioner, we . . . recognized that McDonald’s franchises encompass at-
tributes that have traditionally been viewed as goodwill. . . .
. . . .
The right to use the McDonald’s system, trade name, and trademarks is
the essence of the McDonald’s franchise. . . . Respondent did not iden-
tify, and we cannot discern, any quantifiable goodwill that is not attrib-
utable to the franchise. We find that petitioners acquired no goodwill
that was separate and apart from the goodwill inherent in the McDon-
ald’s franchise. . . .
[T]he franchise acts as the repository for goodwill. . . .
We concluded that the goodwill produced by the McDonald’s system was
embodied in, and inseverable from, the McDonald’s franchise that the tax-
payer received. . . .
. . . .
[Likewise here,] Petitioner’s business in the operating countries was con-
ducted by granting Mister Donut franchises. . . . The franchisees in the operat-
ing countries possessed the exclusive right to open stores pursuant to
established conditions and at locations approved by the franchisor. In order to
ensure that the distinguishing characteristics of Mister Donut were uniformly
maintained, the franchise agreements had established standards for furnish-
ings, equipment, product mixes, and supplies, which the franchisees were re-
quired to meet. The franchise agreements also required that franchisees
operate their shops in accordance with uniform standards of quality, prepara-
tion, appearance, cleanliness, and service. . . .
Mister Donut’s success resulted from the Mister Donut System and the high
standards for quality and service, which the franchisees were required to
meet.80
As a general proposition, the Tax Court thus held that § 865(d)(3)
applies only where the foreign goodwill can be separated from the
other enumerated intangibles under § 865(d)(2). And in this particular
listed in section 865(d)(2). If the sourcing provision contained in section
865(d)(3) also extended to the goodwill element embodied in the other
intangible assets enumerated in section 865(d)(2), the exception would
swallow the rule. Such an interpretation would nullify the general rule
that income from the sale of an intangible asset by a U.S. resident is to
be sourced in the United States.
Id. at 37–38.
80. Id. at 40–43 (sixth and eighth omissions in original) (first, second, third, fourth,
fifth, seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth, and eleventh emphases added) (internal quo-
tations omitted) (citing Canterbury v. Comm’r, 99 T.C. 223 (1992)). As discussed
in the next section, Canterbury involved § 1253, a special section covering
franchises, trademarks and trade names. Given the very different legislative his-
tories developed in that section, one might question whether the court gave too
much weight to the prior Canterbury decision.
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case, the taxpayer failed that requirement due to the Mister Donut
franchise, which subsumed the entire business goodwill.81
While International Multifoods rejected the taxpayer’s goodwill at-
tempt, foreign-sourcing opportunities remain outside the franchise
context.82 The two prior illustrative examples will demonstrate this
franchise dividing line.
1. Example 1A: Bud Selig’s Tax Case
Recall how Bud Selig purchased the Brewers baseball franchise for
$10,800,000 and allocated 95% to player contracts, with 5% to the
franchise. The tax administrators argued for a higher allocation to the
franchise. To engage the new sourcing material, assume now that the
baseball team is the Yomiuri Giants: i.e., “the New York Yankees of
Japan,” given their large number of championships and huge
popularity.83
As discussed in Part II, the buyer Bud Selig fought the tax admin-
istrators solely over the franchise and player-contracts values.84 But
at least prior to International Multifoods, the seller would have an
additional goodwill incentive under § 865(d)(3), especially given the
81. See, e.g., RUFUS VON THULEN RHOADES & MARSHALL J. LANGER, U.S. INTERNA-
TIONAL TAXATION AND TAX TREATIES § 14.03 (Matthew Bender ed. 2017).
82. The court gave significant focus to the franchise aspect. See supra text accompa-
nying note 80.
83. Mike Axisa, Three Executives Resign as Yomiuri Giants Rocked by Gambling
Scandal, CBS SPORTS (Mar. 9, 2016), https://www.cbssports.com/mlb/news/three-
executives-resign-as-yomiuri-giants-rocked-by-gambling-scandal [http://perma
.unl.edu/6VEW-83LV].
84. The case did not engage in distinctions between franchise and goodwill value
given the comparable treatment of these two intangibles to the buyer. See supra
notes 38–40 and accompanying text.
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team’s popularity.85 The International Multifoods decision might,
however, dissuade such attempt given the franchise context.86
Given International Multifoods’ focus on the Mr. Donut franchise,
consider now the restaurant example.87
85. While a player’s contract allocation also would seem to generate foreign-source
income, a goodwill attempt under § 865(d)(3) would protect against an IRS chal-
lenge to an oversized allocation to such player contracts. In this regard, the
§ 865(d)(2) listed intangibles do not mention workforce in place. Cf. I.R.C.
§ 197(d)(1)(C)(i) (2012) (explicitly mentioning workforce in place). Thus, assum-
ing § 865(d)(2) does not apply (as discussed below), any depreciation recapture
would be sourced as above with the remaining gain sourced like inventory at the
place of sale (the place where the “rights, title and interest of the seller in the
property are transferred to the buyer”). Treas. Reg. § 1.861-7(c) (1960); see I.R.C.
§§ 865I(2), 861(a)(6), 862(a)(6) (2012). The government might try to push back in
one of two ways. First, it might argue that the franchise also encapsulates player
contracts. The earlier Bud Selig decision counteracts that approach, however. See
supra notes 34–40 and accompanying text. Second, the government might argue
that § 865(d)(2)’s residual “or other like property” includes workforce in place. In
the somewhat similar § 367(d) context, prior to the recent regulations, the IRS
asserted that the similar catchall in § 936 covered workforce in place. See, e.g.,
Wells, supra note 60, at 552. Note that the final regulations do not take a position
with respect to whether goodwill, going concern value, or workforce in place are
§ 936(h)(3)(B) intangibles but rather give the taxpayer a choice between the
§ 367(a) and 367(d) regimes. See DELOITTE, FINAL SECTION 367(A)/(D) REGULA-
TIONS RETROACTIVELY PREVENT TAX-FREE OUTBOUND TRANSFERS OF FOREIGN
GOODWILL AND GOING CONCERN VALUE nn.1, 6 (2016), https://www2.deloitte.com/
content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Tax/dttl-tax-alert-united-states-367-20-
december-2016.pdf [http://perma.unl.edu/8BJF-C8EX]. Unlike the § 367(d) con-
text, however, an expansive reading of § 865(d)(2) seemingly contradicts the stat-
ute (at least as to goodwill) as § 865(d)(3) clearly contemplates foreign sourcing
from the sale of foreign goodwill. In addition, § 865 is more narrowly drawn than
the broader § 936, which has many more enumerated intangibles. See supra note
97 and accompanying text.
86. A taxpayer nonetheless might forge ahead on grounds that a baseball franchise
differs from the donut franchising operations in International Multifoods. Alter-
natively, a taxpayer might take into account the fact that International Mul-
tifoods is just a lower court decision. See also Sourcing Goodwill Separately from
Other Intangibles, CBIZ (Dec. 27, 2012), https://www.cbiz.com/insights-resources/
details/articleid/1404/sourcing-goodwill-separately-from-other-intangibles-article
[http://perma.unl.edu/DWU5-VQPY] for one firm’s view that subsequent author-
ity under a different Code section (§ 1031) recognizes the separation of trade-
marks and undercuts the holding of International Multifoods. As discussed
below, though, that subsequent authority involved trademarks without the envel-
oping franchise aspect. Thus, this viewpoint’s persuasiveness strengthens outside
the franchise context. Taking a step back, one might question the theoretic ap-
peal of the International Multifoods’ approach to franchises. As discussed infra
text accompanying note 124, goodwill serves as a proxy for the foreign taxation of
the intangibles gain. As a theoretic matter then, this suggests the appropriate-
ness of foreign sourcing for goodwill even in the franchise context where such
gain faces foreign taxation. See infra notes 135–40 and accompanying text.
87. Interestingly, § 865(d)(2) as originally enacted in 1986 did not include franchises.
Franchises were added to the § 865(d)(2) list by the Technical and Miscellaneous
Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, § 1012(d)(12), 102 Stat. 3342, 3499,
2018] GOODWILL HUNTING GONE BAD 901
2. Example 2A: Bud’s London Bar & Grill
Assume now that Bud Selig sells his London Bar & Grill for
$10,800,000. The transfer again includes the following intangible as-
sets: trademarks, copyrights, patents, trade secrets, customer lists,
and goodwill.
In contrast to the last example, the lack of any encapsulating
franchise emboldens the seller’s goodwill-hunting position. Following
International Multifoods, goodwill associated with any of the enumer-
ated intangibles (such as the trademarks) seemingly would not qualify
for the special § 865(d)(3) goodwill-sourcing rule. But goodwill unasso-
ciated with any listed intangibles (such as the customer lists) seem-
ingly would qualify as foreign sourced.88
Especially given the close association of trademarks and good-
will,89 consider further this important difference between trademark-
associated goodwill and other goodwill. Drawing upon one commenta-
apparently as the initial exclusion was an oversight. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM.
ON TAXATION, 100TH CONG., DESCRIPTION OF THE TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS ACT OF
1988 (H.R. 4333 AND S. 2238) 259 (Comm. Print 1988) (failing to explicitly men-
tion this change, but discussing more generally “conforming amendments”); see
also Harvey Dale, Effectively Connected Income, 42 TAX L. REV. 689, 718 n.179
(1987) (“New § 865(d)(2) contains a definition of ‘intangible’ which is virtually
identical [to § 862(a)(4)], except for the omission of ‘franchises.’ That omission is
particularly interesting because the very purpose of the § 865(d)(2) definition is
to cross-refer to § 862(a)(4).”).
88. Also, while not a goodwill-hunting point per se, a similar allocation problem re-
mains to the extent that taxpayers attempt to establish value on the nonlisted
assets themselves (rather than on the associated goodwill). The exclusion of cus-
tomer lists from § 865(d)(2), in contrast to §§ 936 and 197, therefore encourages
taxpayers to place value on unlisted assets like customer lists since they will re-
ceive the favorable result so long as the value is sustainable for either the asset
itself or the associated goodwill. Compare General Television, Inc. v. United
States, 449 F. Supp. 609, 611–12 (D. Minn. 1978), where the court distinguished
depreciable customer lists separate from goodwill from nondepreciable customer
lists inseparable from goodwill under the law prior to § 197:
Therefore, because the subscriber contracts served primarily as a mea-
sure of the . . . systems’ earning capacity and because goodwill is based
primarily upon earning capacity, the court is of the opinion that to the
extent that the intangible assets purchased by the plaintiff consisted of
subscriber contracts those assets constituted goodwill.
Id. at 611. Emboldened taxpayers now can win without having to make such dis-
tinctions so long as their allocated valuations are sustainable.
89. This is evidenced by the fact that a valid trademark assignment must also in-
clude the goodwill. See Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d
947, 956 (7th Cir. 1992) (“[T]he transfer of a trademark apart from the good will
of the business which it represents is an invalid ‘na’ed’ ‘r ‘in gr’ss’ assignme”t,“
which passes no rights to the assignee.”) For some good case cites linking trade-
marks and goodwill, see, for example, LaFrance, supra note 29, at 334 n.67. For a
general discussion of the role of goodwill in trademark law and the difficulties
defining goodwill, see Robert G. Bone, Hunting Goodwill: A History of the Concept
of Goodwill in Trademark Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 547 (2006).
902 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96:883
tor’s project and terminology, “over-all goodwill” extends beyond the
goodwill associated with a trademark.90 This broader “over-all good-
will” concept also comports with other commentary and cases. For in-
stance, one commentator contrasts the “goodwill associated with the
mark [from] other business goodwill, i.e., arising from location, cus-
tomer lists, favorable trading or governmental relationships, etc.”91
Another commentator notes a number of other assets which can con-
tribute to goodwill along with trademarks: “goodwill . . . is dependent
for its existence on other things such as a name, license, trademark,
business contracts, know how, etc.”92 One court similarly has
explained:
The competitive advantage which comprises goodwill is represented by a num-
ber of property rights or interests, including [but not limited to]
tradenames . . . , trademarks . . . , some customer lists . . . , customer routes
and other distribution networks, and secret formulae or processes . . . .93
In addition, IRS authority in the § 1031 like-kind-exchange area94
recognizes trademarks as just one component part of over-all goodwill
90. Megan Bartkowski, Trademarks as Components of Goodwill, 19 J. CONTEMP. LE-
GAL ISSUES 165, 166 (2010).
91. See Pamela Chestek, Assigning “Goodwill”, PROPERTY, INTANGIBLE (July 23,
2008), http://propertyintangible.com/2008/07/assigning-goodwill.html [http://per
ma.unl.edu/AG66-QLHE]. Another commentator similarly characterizes goodwill
as capacious. Michael Grynberg, Thick Marks, Thin Marks, 67 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 13, 29 (2016) (“Goodwill is also a capacious concept. Positive consumer as-
sociations with COCA-COLA are partly due to the soda’s combination of taste
and cost, but they are also the product of advertising and experience. The hazy
memory (or was it in a commercial?) of one’s mother giving the sweet reward of a
soda after a successful trip to the dentist is information created in large part by
someone other than the trademark holder.”).
92. Charles R. McManis, Intellectual Property and International Mergers and Acqui-
sitions, 66 U. CINCINNATI L. REV. 1283, 1309 n.163 (1998); see also Marilyn Bar-
rett, Capital Gain Treatment on Sale of Intangible Assets, 50 U.S.C. MAJOR TAX
PLANNING 1004 (1998) (“A number of questions must be addressed to determine
whether a taxpayer who sells intellectual property is entitled to capital gain
treatment. These include: Can goodwill and going concern value be separated
from transferred trademarks? Can the intangibles be split and the purchase price
allocated between them?”). Several cases indicate that goodwill can be valued
separately. See Int’l Multifoods Corp. v. Comm’r, 108 T.C. 25 (1997); see also
I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 97-38-001 (May 2, 1997) (following Hearst Corp. v. United
States, 13 Cl. Ct. 178 (1987), which held that the ability of a television station to
affiliate with major networks is separate from affiliation with a particular net-
work). Moreover, cases have not held that the ability to affiliate is inherent in the
FCC license and this ability, along with other intangibles, are valued separately
from the FCC license.
93. Philip Morris, Inc. v. Comm’r, 96 T.C. 606, 634 (1991) (emphasis added).
94. Section 1031 provides that taxpayers do not recognize gain (or loss) on the ex-
change of “like-kind” property (e.g., land for other land). I.R.C. § 1031 (2012).
Under Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-2(c)(2) (2005), however, goodwill exchanges cannot
qualify for such nonrecognition. See id. (“The goodwill or going concern value of a
business is not of a like kind to the goodwill or going concern value of another
business.”).
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and the typical ability to separate out trademark value from good-
will.95 Consistent with the above analysis and illustrative examples,
this authority importantly involved trademarks outside the franchise
context.96
Finally, the much narrower list of § 865(d)(2) intangibles compared
to §§ 93697 and 197 further evidences the significant goodwill-hunting
possibilities under § 865. Intangibles listed under § 936 but not § 865
include: any method, program, system, procedure, campaign, survey,
study, forecast, estimate, customer list, or technical data. Intangibles
listed under § 197 but not § 865 include: going concern value;
workforce in place; business books and records, operating systems, or
any other information base (including (customer) lists); any customer-
based intangible;98 any supplier-based intangible;99 any license, per-
mit, or other right granted by a governmental unit or an agency or
95. In a revised position, the Service acknowledged that trademarks could qualify for
like-kind treatment notwithstanding a regulatory prohibition for like-kind ex-
changes on goodwill. Memorandum from Office of Chief Counsel, Internal Reve-
nue Serv., to Joyce L. Sugawara, Media & Entm’t Indus. Counsel (Mar. 13, 2009)
(“Accordingly, intangibles such as trademarks, trade names, mastheads, and cus-
tomer-based intangibles that can be separately described and valued apart from
goodwill qualify as like-kind property under § 1031. In our opinion, except in rare
and unusual situations, intangibles such as trademarks, trade names, mast-
heads, and customer-based intangibles can be separately described and valued
apart from goodwill.” (emphasis added)). Interestingly, note that even the Ser-
vice’s earlier position (which blocked like-kind treatment for trademarks) recog-
nized the distinction between trademark value and overall goodwill. I.R.S. Tech.
Adv. Mem. 2006-02-034 (Sept. 29, 2005) (“Trademarks and trade names are, we
believe, a component of a larger asset, either of goodwill, or of going concern or
both. . . . Since they are so closely related to (if not a part of) the goodwill and
going concern value of a business, it is our view that trademarks and trade names
should not be considered of like-kind under § 1031.” (emphasis added)).
96. As noted above, this authority has in fact led one firm to call into question the
International Multifoods anti-foreign sourcing approach. See Sourcing Goodwill
Separately from Other Intangibles, supra note 86 (“If a case similar to the Inter-
national Multifoods case were to arise today, after the issuance of CCA
200911006, the IRS could not make a consistent argument that the trademarks
and franchises were inextricably related to goodwill and that the franchises and
trademarks embody goodwill.”). As discussed in the text, this viewpoint’s persua-
siveness is much stronger outside the franchise context.
97. See Dale, supra note 87, at 718 n.179 (“New § 865(d)(2) contains a definition of
‘intangible’ which is virtually identical . . . to § 862(a)(4) . . . . For a much longer
list of ‘intangible property,’ compare § 936(h)(3)(B).”).
98. This is defined as “composition of market, market share, and any other value
resulting from future provision of goods or services pursuant relationships . . . in
the ordinary course of business with customers.” I.R.C. § 197(d)(2)(A)(i)–(iii)
(2012).
99. This is defined as “any value resulting from future acquisitions of goods or ser-
vices pursuant to relationships . . . in the ordinary course of business with suppli-
ers of goods or services to be used or sold by the taxpayer.” § 197(d)(3).
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instrumentality thereof; or any covenant not to compete.100 In addi-
tion, § 865 lists secret formulas or processes, whereas both §§ 936 and
197 list process or formulas without the limiting secret qualifier. In
sum, §§ 197 and 936 both highlight a very broad range of intangibles
outside the scope of § 865(d)(2). Combined with § 865(d)(3), this
heightens the goodwill incentives recently denounced by the § 367
regulations.
C. Seller’s Goodwill Incentives for Capital Gains
As demonstrated in this section, a seller’s goodwill incentives ex-
tend beyond foreign tax credits to the lower capital gains rates. As
such, even domestic sales can generate goodwill-hunting mischief by
sellers. In particular, higher goodwill allocations can increase the
amount of low-rate capital gains. Goodwill’s impact on the seller
markedly deviates from § 197’s goodwill neutrality on the buyer’s
side.101 Subsection III.C.1 uncovers the most prominent issue involv-
ing contingent payments over time. Subsection III.C.2 then demon-
strates some additional possibilities even for fixed amounts.
1. Contingent “Earn Outs”
Consider first contingent payments over time based on earnings.
These so-called earn outs are used frequently in intellectual property
transfers, especially given the valuation difficulties.102 As developed
below, these earn outs trigger adverse results to the seller under
100. As discussed supra note 77, the government conceded the foreign sourcing of the
noncompete covenant in International Multifoods.
101. As discussed supra note 32, some more limited planning opportunities remain
under § 197.
102. Daniel A. Izzo, Contingent Payment Transfers of Trademarks: A Sale in License
Clothing, 12 VA. TAX REV. 263, 265, 276 (1992) (“[T]he use of contingent pay-
ments in trademark transfers is common. . . . The uncertain value of a patent or a
trademark makes it reasonable for the parties to use a quasi-royalty arrange-
ment. The value of a patent cannot be determined until the product is manufac-
tured. If the product is successful, the patent was valuable; if the product flops,
the patent was worthless. The same problem exists with trademarks. The value
of a trademark cannot be easily ascertained until it is affixed to a product. If the
sales of the product increase, the trademark is valuable. If sales do not increase,
the trademark is valueless. Because the same ‘inherent uncertainties’ that exist
in patent transfers exist in trademark transfers, contingent payments are
equally reasonable in trademark transfers and patent transfers.”); see also AM.
APPRAISAL, EARN-OUTS AND CONTINGENT CONSIDERATION: VALUATION 1 (2013),
http://www.american-appraisal.com/AA-Files/Library/PDF/Earn-outandContin
gentValuation.pdf [http://perma.unl.edu/57CX-YK3N] (“In M&A deals, it is com-
mon for part of the consideration to be contingent upon earnings performance
over single or multiple periods. Such structures can help bridge the gap between
the buyer’s and seller’s valuation and earnings expectations. They can also pro-
vide a cash flow benefit for the buyer since payments can be deferred until the
company is performing at or above forecasts.”).
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§ 1253 if allocable to franchises or trademarks. Consider again the
Bud Selig tax case, appropriately modified to expose this new aspect.
a. Example 1B: Bud Selig’s Tax Case
In the actual case, Bud Selig purchased the Brewers baseball
franchise for $10,800,000 fixed consideration with a 95% allocation to
the player contracts. Assume now instead the following mixture of
consideration: $5,400,000 payable at closing plus a contingent 10% of
revenue for the next five years.
The buyer Bud would now get the same result under § 197 regard-
less of the allocation of the fixed or contingent payments to player-
contracts, trademark, franchise, goodwill, or going concern values.103
But the seller’s results would vary significantly based on the alloca-
tion. Trademark or franchise allocations would trigger the higher ordi-
nary income rates. Section 1253(c) automatically taints all contingent
payments for “franchises, trademarks or tradenames” as ordinary in-
come.104 Section 1253(a) likewise treats the fixed payments as ordi-
nary if coupled with “substantial” contingent payments.105 In
contrast, allocations to the player contracts, goodwill, and going con-
cern value generally would qualify for the lower capital gains rates.106
In sum, § 1253 maintains the difficult allocative distinctions erased on
the buyer’s side by § 197.107
103. See supra note 38 for contingent payments.
104. The lack of capital gains for contingent payments might seem to make good sense
as contingent payments might seem to be an indicator that the transaction really
is a license (with ordinary royalty income) rather than a sale. See infra notes
151–56 and accompanying text (discussing § 1253 legislative history). But as
brought out in the textual discussion, this ordinary tainting on franchises and
trademarks is at odds with the treatment of contingent payments for other as-
sets. In fact, as discussed in greater detail infra notes 158–59 and accompanying
text, § 1253’s approach on contingent assets directly conflicts with explicit au-
thority for other intellectual property such as patents. See I.R.C. § 1235(a)(2)
(2012); Rev. Rul. 60-226, 1960-1 C.B. 26. Perhaps more to the point, this selective
tainting of only certain assets leads to taxpayer incentives to mischaracterize and
tricky valuation disputes.
105. § 1253(a), (b)(2)(F). In Nabisco Brands v. Commissioner, the tax court held that
contingent payments are substantial if they constitute twenty-five percent or
more of the total estimated value received. 69 T.C.M. (CCH) 2230 (1995).
106. This assumes that the taxpayer can satisfy the regular criteria for capital gains
(e.g., the one-year-holding-period requirement). Assuming satisfaction of such re-
quirements, the taxpayer is incentivized to avoid the automatic ordinary tainting
of contingent payments under § 1253.
107. See Treatment of Certain Transfers of Property to Foreign Corporations, 81 Fed.
Reg. 91,012, 91,015 (Dec. 16, 2016) (“[The] allocation problem is acute . . . because
goodwill and going concern value are particularly difficult to distinguish (perhaps
are even indistinguishable) from . . .  intangibles [like trademarks].”).
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Similar to the prior § 865 analysis, International Multifoods might
dissuade such an attempt given the encapsulating franchise.108 In
this regard, the Canterbury decision referenced in International Mul-
tifoods involved § 1253.109 Canterbury, however, recognized the abil-
ity to separate out some going concern value from the franchise.110 As
discussed previously, going concern value closely aligns with good-
will.111 So even in a franchise case, some seller incentives remain to
push value onto the closely aligned going concern value and perhaps
even goodwill.112
Furthermore, not all businesses involve the goodwill-encapsulating
franchise. Consider now the prior Bud’s Bar & Grill example, again
appropriately modified to expose the contingent payment issues.
b. Example 2B: Sale of Bud’s Bar & Grill
In the original example, Bud Selig sold Bud’s Bar & Grill to Buddy
Buyer for $10,800,000 fixed consideration. As above, assume now in-
stead the following mixture of consideration: $5,400,000 payable at
closing plus a contingent 10% of revenue for the next five years.
Similar to Example 1B, the intangible asset allocation would not
impact the buyer’s taxes under § 197.113 But such allocation would
impact significantly the taxes of seller Bud given the lack of any good-
will-encompassing franchise. Similar to the earlier § 865 analysis,
non-franchise cases place tremendous tax pressure on the intangible
asset allocation.
Furthermore, as we saw previously, a taxpayer’s opportunities in-
crease as the listed intangibles decrease under the relevant tax provi-
sion. In this regard, § 1253 applies to just franchises, trademarks, and
trade names. In comparison, § 865 includes also patents, copyrights,
secret processes or formulas, trade brand, and a residual “other like
108. See supra section II.B.
109. Albeit, the case involved a now-outdated aspect of § 1253. This aspect concerned
the buyer’s treatment rather than the seller. Prior to its 1993 amendment in con-
nection with the enactment of § 197, § 1253(d)(2)(A) permitted depreciation over
no more than ten years for qualified payments made for a franchise or trade-
mark. Canterbury involved the application of this (now-outdated) aspect of
§ 1253. Canterbury v. Comm’r, 99 T.C. 223, 245 (1992). For more on this former
provision, see infra notes 165–69 and accompanying text.
110. In particular, the court separated out the “workforce in place” component of going
concern value. Canterbury, 99 T.C. at 253. Interestingly, note how this workforce
in place (denied depreciation under Canterbury due to its lack of a defined useful
life) is somewhat reminiscent of the player contracts permitted depreciation over
five years in the Bud Selig case (based on the average contract duration).
111. See earlier reference to this distinction supra note 103 and accompanying text.
112. As to possible remaining goodwill attempts even in the franchise context, see
supra note 86.
113. As discussed supra note 38, the buyer depreciates contingent payments over the
remaining life left on the original fifteen-year timeline.
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property.”114 Thus, § 1253 expands the goodwill opportunities relative
to § 865. Importantly, these other assets can be associated with good-
will, similar to trademarks.115 So even if goodwill associated with the
trademark remains subject to § 1253,116 this portion of goodwill must
be separated out from the goodwill associated with other intangibles
like patents, trade secrets and copyrights.
2. Fixed-Consideration Incentives
This section highlights various provisions of the Code which pre-
serve sellers’ allocation issues even on fixed consideration. In addition
to § 1253, the Code provides a mixture of (1) taxpayer-favored rules on
the sale of self-created patents and (2) taxpayer-disfavored rules on
the sale of self-created copyrights. The taxpayer-friendly § 1235 allows
qualified patent creators to receive capital gains even if they other-
wise would not qualify due to a professional-inventor status or failure
to hold the patent for the requisite one year.117 In the other direction,
114. And further recall how § 865 already presented a more narrow range than either
§ 197 or § 936. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
115. See, e.g., Oakley Inc. v. Sunglass Hut Int’l, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1658, 1667–68
(C.D. Cal. 2001) (“If Defendants are permitted to continue to sell their [product]
during the pendency of this lawsuit they will erode [plaintiff’s] exclusivity and
goodwill associated with these products. . . . Accordingly, the Court finds that if
the Defendants are not enjoined, there is a likelihood of erosion to [plaintiff’s]
market presence and its goodwill associated with its patented [product].” (em-
phasis added)); see also MARTIN D. FERN, 7 WARREN’S FORMS OF AGREEMENTS
§ 8.6 (Matthew Bender ed. 2017) (“ ‘Intangible Personal Property’ shall mean all
intangible properties owned by the Company . . . includ[ing] (i) the name . . . and
all other registered and unregistered trademarks, service marks, trade names
and slogans, all applications therefor, and all associated goodwill; (ii) all statu-
tory, common law and registered copyrights, all applications therefor and all as-
sociated goodwill; (iii) all patents and patent applications, all associated technical
information, shop rights, know-how, trade secrets, processes, operating, mainte-
nance and other manuals, drawings and specifications, process flow diagrams
and related data, and all associated goodwill . . . .”); id. § 63.2 (“Seller hereby
irrevocably sells . . . to Buyer all of its . . . intellectual and industrial property
rights associated with the Domain Name . . . , including but not limited to trade-
marks, service marks, trade names, trade dress, logos, designs, copyrights, pat-
ents, and trade secrets together with all goodwill associated with any of the
foregoing (if any), and all other intellectual and industrial property rights related
thereto, including all renewals and extensions thereof (collectively ‘IP’).”).
116. In this regard, International Multifoods relied on the fact that § 865(d)(2) explic-
itly included goodwill in its coverage. See supra note 79. In contrast, § 1253 does
not explicitly include goodwill in its coverage.  On the other hand, Canterbury
nonetheless included associated goodwill within the meaning of franchise for
§ 1253 purposes. See supra notes 109–10 and accompanying text. A similar ap-
proach would include goodwill associated with the trademark within the reach of
§ 1253.
117. Technically, the regular rules require a holding period of more than one year (i.e.,
a year and a day). I.R.C. §§ 1(h), 1222 (2012). Further note how a professional-
inventor status also usually would negate capital gains under § 1221(a)(1). In
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the taxpayer-unfriendly § 1221(a)(3) denies capital gains for self-cre-
ated copyrights and similar property even if the taxpayer otherwise
qualifies for capital gains.118 And linking back to subsection III.C.1,
fixed payments for trademarks can qualify for capital gains if they sat-
isfy the regular capital gains rules and the special § 1253 trademark
rules.119
These varying rules for different intellectual property raise alloca-
tion issues even for fixed-payment business sales. A goodwill alloca-
tion could benefit a seller who might otherwise fall prey to
§ 1221(a)(3). For instance, if Bud wrote the restaurant’s recipe book
himself, he could benefit from an allocation to goodwill and away from
the copyright. In the other direction, professional sellers could benefit
from allocations to patents and away from goodwill.120 This would in-
centivize a government quest for goodwill reminiscent of the land-
scape prior to the 1993 enactment of § 197.
IV. RESPONSES TO GOODWILL HUNTING GONE BAD
Part III highlighted the ongoing goodwill problems despite the re-
cent § 367 regulations. This Part therefore proposes legislative correc-
tions to the remaining problematic areas.121 Section IV.A first
addition, note how a patent transferor still needs to satisfy other criteria under
§ 1235 such as the transfer of all substantial rights, discussed in greater detail
infra notes 175–76 and accompanying text. Finally, the benefits of § 1235 extend
also to qualified financing individuals, who acquire the patent prior to actual re-
duction to practice. I.R.C. § 1235(b)(2) (2012). As discussed infra note 118, the
recent tax bill extended § 1221(a)(3)(A) to include self-created patents and com-
parable property. As such, a patent creator must now satisfy § 1235 in order to
obtain capital gains treatment.
118. Prior to the recent tax bill, § 1221(a)(3)(A) denied capital gains to “a copyright, a
literary, musical, or artistic composition, a letter or memorandum, or similar
property, held by a taxpayer whose personal efforts created such property.” The
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, however, extended § 1221(a)(3)(A) to include patents and
comparable property like inventions, models, and designs. The denial extends, in
other limited circumstance, to taxpayers as well under § 1221(a)(3)(B), (C).
119. As discussed supra note 105 and accompanying text, the lack of substantial con-
tingent payments is one such additional requirement. As discussed infra note
176, § 1253 has some additional requirements.
120. As noted above, § 1235 can overcome an otherwise denial of capital gains to pro-
fessional sellers under §1221(a)(1).
121. In contrast to the recent § 367 regulatory response, this Article proposes legisla-
tive changes for a combination of reasons. First, § 367 presented a unique regula-
tory interpretative response due to its dual components (§ 367(a) and § 367(d)).
The interpretative regulations avoided a statutory conflict via a limited partial
response (mandating application of either § 367(a) or § 367(d)). The additional
goodwill-hunting sections highlighted here lack such a comparable opportunity.
For instance, § 865(d)(3) explicitly carves out goodwill, blocking a regulatory
workaround. In addition, even § 367’s partial regulatory response raises potential
taxpayer challenges to the regulatory authority. And furthermore, the limited
regulatory approach still leaves planning opportunities on the table. For a possi-
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resolves the § 865(d) sourcing difficulties by replacing the current
problematic goodwill exception. Foreign-source status should require
instead the actual foreign taxation of the intangibles gain. Section
IV.B then proposes a simple solution to the contingent payment prob-
lem: the removal of trademarks from the troublesome § 1253.122 Sec-
tion IV.C then rectifies the capital gains problem for fixed payments.
Drawing upon § 197, the specialized §§ 1221(a)(3) and 1235 capital
gain rules should apply only to separately sold patents and copyrights
and not to those sold as part of a business.
A. Replace Goodwill-Sourcing Exception with Foreign
Taxation
As developed below, goodwill now operates as a poor proxy under
§ 865(d)(3) for the real legislative goal. Congress wanted to link the
usage of foreign tax credits to actual foreign taxation of any in-
tangibles gain.123 But goodwill cannot achieve this mission, especially
given the inability to separate goodwill value from other associated
intangibles. This section therefore proposes the substitution instead of
a more direct link to the underlying goal. As shown below, special
treaty sourcing rules provide a clear roadmap for the feasibility today
of such a direct connection.
1. Underlying Goals of § 865(d)(2) and (d)(3)
The § 865(d) legislative history evidences a Congressional desire to
link the desired foreign sourcing of gains to the actual foreign taxation
of such gains. As developed below through an illustrative example,
such linkage prevents manipulations around the foreign-tax-credit
limitation. The following excerpt from the 1986 legislative history evi-
dences these points:
Congress believed that source rules for sales of personal property should gen-
erally reflect the location of the economic activity generating the income, tak-
ing into account the jurisdiction in which those activities are
performed. . . . [W]ith substantial reduction of U.S. tax rates provided in the
Act, more U.S. taxpayers would have excess foreign tax credits and that,
ble limited regulatory response to the § 1253 issue, see Izzo, supra note 102. But
as noted therein, the suggested regulatory response fails to address the primary
§ 1253 culprit: the automatic tainting of the contingent payments regardless of
their amount. And given such a statutory provision, an appropriate change re-
quires legislative action.
122. As noted above, § 1253 includes both trademarks and trade names in its coverage
(in addition to franchises). For ease of exposition, this section again will use
“trademarks” to reference both trademarks and trade names.
123. At first blush, it might seem like the taxpayer could benefit from a foreign tax
credit (FTC) on such income only where the taxpayer actually paid tax on such
income. Foreign sourcing of the income could provide additional FTC benefits
even without any such foreign tax, however, if the taxpayer has excess foreign
taxes (above the existing credit limits) on other foreign income.
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therefore, there would be more incentive after tax reform to generate low-taxed
foreign source income to absorb the excess foreign tax credits. Congress noted
that the foreign tax credit mechanism was originally established to eliminate
double taxation of the same income by the United States and foreign coun-
tries. Congress did not believe that the potential for double taxation existed
where income had little likelihood of attracting foreign tax. With the above in
mind, Congress modified prior law[ ] . . . [to] treat as foreign source income
only that income which is generated within a foreign country and which is
likely to be subject to foreign tax. . . .
. . . .
. . . Congress realized that in cases where manipulation of [the former
“place of sale” rule] occurs, there is little likelihood that foreign countries tax
this income. Congress believed in these circumstances that the residence of
the seller should govern the source of the income since countries rarely tax
personal property gains on a source basis.124
The following example illustrates the Congressional concern over
foreign-tax-credit manipulation. Assume a corporate taxpayer re-
ported $2,000,000 of net income and paid $510,000 foreign income tax.
Assume initially that the corporation appropriately reports an equal
split of U.S.- and foreign-source income ($1,000,000 for each category).
Before the foreign tax credit, the corporation’s U.S. tax liability equals
$680,000 (determined at the 34% general corporate rate).125 The cor-
poration can offset only half of such amount ($340,000) with the for-
eign taxes paid under § 904,126 leaving $340,000 payable to the U.S.
government.127
Assume now that the taxpayer reports an additional $500,000 of
foreign-source income without any change to the foreign taxes paid.128
If so, the usable tax credit increases to the full $510,000 foreign tax,129
reducing the payable U.S. tax to just $170,000.130 This tax-planning
opportunity stems from the general aggregate approach of the foreign
tax credit.131 As demonstrated above, such aggregate approach allows
low (or no) tax foreign-source income to liberate excess foreign tax
paid on some other foreign income.132
124. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 99TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE
TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, at 917–18 (Comm. Print 1987) (emphasis added).
125. See I.R.C. § 11 (2012).
126. The initial $680,000 tax bill times the 1/2 ratio of foreign-source income to all
income ($1,000,000/$2,000,000). See supra note 67. Note how this equals the 34%
U.S rate times the $1,000,000 of foreign source income.
127. This would equal $680,000 initial tax less the $340,000 credit.
128. Similar to International Multifoods, supra note 78 and accompanying text, the
taxpayer might attempt this through an aggressive goodwill allocation.
129. The initial $680,000 tax bill times the 3/4 ratio of foreign source income to all in-
come ($1,500,000/$2,000,000). Note how this equals the 34% U.S rate times the
$1,500,000 of foreign source income.
130. $680,000 initial tax less the $510,000 credit.
131. As to be discussed infra notes 139–42 and accompanying text, the foreign tax
credit operates on a more specific income basis in certain cases.
132. “Excess foreign tax” means tax imposed at a rate above the U.S. rate. For in-
stance, in the above example, the corporation paid $510,000 foreign tax on only
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2. Goodwill as a Poor Proxy for Real Goal
As evidenced by the legislative history above, Congress desired
linkage of foreign sourcing to the foreign taxation of such income. Con-
gress provided the goodwill exception to the general U.S. sourcing of
intangibles gain as a proxy to accomplish such goal. But as demon-
strated throughout Part III, goodwill cannot be readily separated from
other overlapping intangible assets.133 Goodwill thus fails its mission
as desirable proxies should be readily determinable.134 In addition to
such practical shortcoming, there is no clear linkage of the proxy to
the underlying goal even in theory. For instance, the legislative his-
tory fails to support the International Multifoods dividing line be-
tween goodwill associated with the listed intangibles and
unassociated goodwill.135 In addition, International Multifoods also
$1,000,000 of legitimate foreign income. This suggests a foreign tax rate of 51%
on such income, higher than the U.S. 34% rate.
133. Recall again the lessons from § 367 provided in the preamble to the § 367 regula-
tions. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
134. For recognition that proxies should be readily determinable, see, for example,
RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2014) (“The use of a single, readily
determinable characteristic such as age as the basis for an employment decision
economizes on the cost of information.”); Stephen Bainbridge, Director Primacy:
The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 596 n.235
(2003) (“Firms can readily determine their respective equity and debt costs of
capital, which seems a reasonable proxy for measuring the value of (and thus the
contribution of) financial inputs.”); Nina Kohn, Rethinking the Constitutionality
of Age Discrimination: A Challenge to a Decades-Old Consensus, 44 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 213, 279 (2010) (“For example, chronological age may be considered a valid
proxy for individual characteristics such as maturity, frailty, vulnerability, or
worthiness. This perception, combined with the administrative appeal of chrono-
logical age as a proxy (chronological age criteria are easy to implement because
chronological age can be readily determined without the need for discretion), en-
courages over-reliance on such criteria.”); Jody Kraus, Decoupling Sales Law
from the Acceptance-Rejection Fulcrum, 104 YALE L.J. 129, 144 (1974) (“There is
no need to use the acceptance-rejection fulcrum as a proxy for possession when
possession can be even more easily and accurately determined than rejection and
acceptance.”).
135. As discussed above, International Multifoods distinguished associated and unas-
sociated goodwill, with only the later qualifying for foreign sourcing. See Int’l
Multifoods Corp. v. Commissioner, 108 T.C. 25 (1997); supra section II.B. For this
distinction to achieve the desired goal even in theory, foreign jurisdictions would
have to tax only the latter unassociated goodwill. There is no support in the legis-
lative history for this proposition. More generally, the legislative history lacks a
clear explanation of the goodwill link to actual foreign taxation. Perhaps this cor-
relates to the notion in the § 367 legislative history that foreign goodwill gener-
ally lacks abuse potential. For an example of the recent reference to such
legislative history in the preamble to the § 367 regulations, see Treatment of Cer-
tain Transfers of Property to Foreign Corporations, 81 Fed. Reg. 91,012,
91,014–15 (Dec. 16, 2016). As such, Congress might have believed that foreign
jurisdictions more likely would tax foreign-generated goodwill. But again, the re-
cent § 367 regulations counter this non-abusive notion of goodwill, and Interna-
tional Multifoods highlights the theoretical difficulties in utilizing (undefined)
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highlights how some of the other listed intangibles, such as trade-
marks, might face meaningful foreign tax.136
3. Substitute Actual Taxation and Link to Treaty Rules
Mindful today of all the difficulties separating out goodwill,137 why
not link foreign-source status directly to the actual foreign taxation of
intangibles gain? The legislative history and the example above might
suggest initial concern over foreign-tax-credit manipulations where
the gain faces only a low foreign tax rate.138 Special treaty-based
sourcing rules developed over time, however, show a clear pathway to
reform. Section 865(h) provides a taxpayer election to report in-
tangibles gain as foreign source if a treaty sources the gain to a foreign
country and the taxpayer agrees to calculate the credit limit sepa-
rately for such gain.139 This latter “separate basket” requirement is
the key, as demonstrated by adjustments to the earlier example.
In the above example, an extra $500,000 of reported foreign-source
income liberated $170,000 foreign tax credits independent of any for-
eign tax payments. To engage the separate basket aspect, further as-
sume now that the taxpayer actually paid $50,000 foreign tax on this
extra $500,000 of foreign-source income. This would not change the
above result of $170,000 credit liberation under § 904’s regular aggre-
gate approach.140 The separate basket approach, however, neatly lim-
its the additional credit allowance to just the $50,000 foreign tax paid
on the foreign-source income in question. The separate basket ap-
goodwill as an appropriate standard. In addition, International Multifoods also
highlights how some of the other listed intangibles, such as trademarks, might
face meaningful foreign tax.
136. Consider the following quote from one of the taxpayer’s employees:
My main concern, though, is with uncertain tax consequences surround-
ing the transfer of trademarks in the Peoples Republic of China, Taiwan,
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Hong Kong. It is possible that the
trademark transfers could generate a tax in these countries. Therefore,
if amounts are to be allocated to the trademarks associated with these
countries, the purchase price allocated to them should be as little as
possible.
Int’l Multifoods, 108 T.C. at 34.
137. Recall again the lessons from § 367 provided in the preamble to the § 367 regula-
tions. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
138. Recall the legislative history quote to that effect. See supra note 124. For an ex-
ample of this concern where the taxpayer pays some foreign tax but at a rate
below the U.S. rate, see the modified example infra notes 141–42 and accompany-
ing text.
139. Subsections 904(d)(6) and (h)(10) provide comparable rules. As discussed supra
note 67, the § 904 credit also applies separately to passive income. I.R.C.
§ 904(d)(6), (h)(10) (2012); see also I.R.C. § 904(d)(1)(A) (2012) (“The provisions of
subsections (a), (b), and (c) and sections 902, 907, 960 shall be applied separately
with respect to . . . passive category income . . . .”).
140. See supra note 67 and accompanying text for the general credit approach of
§ 904(a).
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proach essentially limits the increased credit to the lesser of (1) the
actual foreign tax paid on the separate basket income ($50,000
here)141 or (2) the product of the income times the U.S. 34% rate
($170,000  here).142
As background, § 865(h) adopted the separate basket election as a
response to the “later in time” treaty issue.143 In addition, the appeal
of double taxation relief accelerates in the treaty context given the ne-
gotiated reciprocity with another jurisdiction.144 The current goodwill
exception, however, evidences a similar Congressional desire to pro-
vide appropriate relief from the potentially onerous intangibles-sourc-
ing rule. In particular, the regular intangibles rule imposes the
negative U.S. sourcing even upon gain subject to significant foreign
tax.145 And so expansion of the tried-and-tested treaty rules appeals
as the best way to heed both the Congressional desire for an in-
tangibles escape hatch and the status quo bias against untested
reforms.146
141. Like the regular aggregate rules under § 904, the credit can never exceed the
actual foreign taxes paid. The separate basket approach addresses the liberation
concern by forcing the taxpayer to calculate that limit separately on a smaller
component of overall income.
142. This amount would be 34% times only the $500,000 of separate basket intangible
gain.
143. Under the “later in time” rule, legislation generally overrides conflicting treaty
provisions already in place. For a discussion of this concept and the relationship
to § 865(h), see ELIZABETH KESSENIDES, N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N TAX SECTION, RE-
PORT ON TREATY RE-SOURCING RULES 11 (2014), https://www.nysba.org/Sections/
Tax/Tax_Section_Reports/Tax_Reports_2014/Tax_Section_Report_1313.html.
144. See Walter Hellerstein, Georg Kofler & Ruth Mason, Constitutional Restraints on
Corporate Tax Integration, 62 TAX L. REV. 1, 9–10 (2008) (“[B]y refusing to extend
benefits unilaterally [in a different context], states may hope to negotiate for re-
ciprocal economic double tax relief obligations in tax treaties.”).
145. In an interesting link to § 367, Congress granted foreign sourcing on § 367(d)’s
imputed supper royalty. I.R.C. § 367(d)(2)(C) (2012). As a possible tradeoff, Con-
gress also provided that the income would be ordinary. This tradeoff loses its bite
in the parent–subsidiary context since corporations do not receive a lower capital
gains rate (although it could impact their ability to use capital losses against the
income). I.R.C. § 1211(a) (2012) (allowing capital losses only to the extent of capi-
tal gains).
146. For examples of the tried-and-tested-benefit, see Alschner, supra note 16, at 51
(“[I]nvestment law suffers from status quo bias: path dependency dominates over
prolific innovation. Treaty design evolution, where it takes place, consists of
states opting into and refining tried and tested language rather than trying out
something new. This path dependency prevents more radical change, even where
this change may be on balance beneficial.”); Nicholas H.D. Foster, Company Law
Theory in Comparative Perspective: England and France, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 573,
613 (2000) (“[T]he [Steering] Group writes that: many of the more radical reforms
have been tried and tested for some years in advanced economies with common
law traditions like our own and their success there has given us confidence in
them.” (citations omitted)); Richard H. Walker, Evaluating the Preemption Evi-
dence: Have the Proponents Met Their Burden, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 237
(1997) (“Throughout the preemption debate, the Commission has preached an im-
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In sum, Congress should extend the § 865(h) election to all “in-
tangibles” gain, irrespective of any treaty interplay. As a corollary
change, Congress should delete the ineffective, and confusing,
§ 865(d)(3) goodwill exception.147
B. Franchise Attack Gone Bad: Drop Trademarks from
§ 1253
As developed below, § 1253 should be amended to drop trademarks
from its coverage for a combination of reasons. First, as evidenced by
the legislative history, tax-avoidance concerns over split-interest
franchises motivated the enactment of § 1253. Second, § 1253’s ordi-
nary income tainting of contingent payments for trademarks contra-
dicts other tax rules which sanction capital gains for other intellectual
property. Such ordinary income tainting not only presents an unduly
harsh outcome for trademarks but also presents significant allocative
difficulties for business sales. In addition, while § 1253 originally pro-
vided beneficial buyer consequences, subsequent changes have essen-
tially negated this balanced offset to buyers.148 Finally, the
elimination of trademarks from § 1253 would address needless discon-
tinuities and interpretative issues, especially regarding trademark lit-
igation receipts.149
portant message: The short time since passage of the Act has not allowed for
sufficient practical experience with its key provisions or for many court decisions
interpreting those provisions. . . . This alone mandates a cautious approach to-
ward making federal securities law the exclusive law of the land.”).
147. In addition to its questionable theoretic and practical support, § 865(d)(2) and
(d)(3) together present a confusing statutory scheme as both reference goodwill.
Subsection 865(d)(2) references it under its U.S.-sourcing rule while § 865(d)(3)
singles it out under its foreign-sourcing rule. As discussed at note 79, Interna-
tional Multifoods tried to reconcile the confusing statute. But for all the above
reasons, the statute would benefit from a necessary change.
148. In addition to increasing the seemingly unjustified harshness of the rules, it also
increases the incentives to structure around. See infra note 169 and accompany-
ing text.
149. For a prior commentary also challenging § 1253’s application to contingent pay-
ments for trademarks, see Izzo, supra note 102. Such prior commentary signifi-
cantly differs from my approach both in its mode of analysis and its scope of
reform. As to the analysis, the prior article did not focus on the broader goodwill-
hunting aspect, the central theme of this Article. Somewhat accordingly, it pro-
poses a much narrower reform, limited to the substantiality trigger for the taint-
ing of fixed payments. As discussed supra note 105 and accompanying text, even
fixed payments become tainted when the contingent payments constitute a sub-
stantial component of the overall consideration. The prior article proposes a more
lenient approach to the substantiality tainting of fixed payments. Izzo, supra
note 102, at 277–78 (proposing a safe harbor exemption for contingent payments
which expire within ten years). This proposal is much narrower than my ap-
proach in that it does not address the automatic tainting of the contingent pay-
ments themselves under § 1253(c). In addition, given the lack of focus on the
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1. Congressional Motivation: Split-Interest Franchises
As explained by the Syncsort court, “Section 1253 . . . was enacted
in response to a series of conflicting court decisions dealing with the
extent to which franchisees’ payments to franchisors qualify for capital
gains treatment.”150 Furthermore, “[a] franchise is a business. Con-
gress enacted Section 1253 in response to a franchise boom in which
franchisors licensed various assets to franchisees and thereby helped
establish the franchisees in the business of distributing, selling, or
providing the goods, services, or facilities within specified areas.”151
In particular, various taxpayers claimed capital gains on their trans-
fers of Dairy Queen franchise rights despite their retention of various
control rights and the significant separation of the ownership rights
among many recipients. The circuit courts’ differing results in these
franchise cases furthered the need for a Congressional response.152
Thus, Congressional concern over the proper treatment of split-inter-
est franchising provided the motivation for § 1253.153
The fact that the original House bill did not even apply to trade-
marks further supports Syncsort’s franchise-motivation conclusion.
And while the Senate marked up the House bill to include trade-
marks, a close reading of the Senate Report likewise supports Sync-
sort’s franchise-motivation take.154 First, the Senate Report
discussion very closely tracks the House’s franchise-based discussion.
Without any deeper explanation, the Senate Report simply states that
“a similar situation [to franchises] exists in the case of transfers of
goodwill hunting aspect, the article does not address the other reform areas cov-
ered in this Article.
150. Syncsort Inc. v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 545, 548 (1994) (emphasis added) (cita-
tions omitted).
151. Id. at 548–53 (emphasis added). This case held that amounts received on multiple
franchise transfers were ordinary income since the taxpayer retained significant
rights (including substantial contingent payments). As part of its analysis, the
court rejected the taxpayer’s argument that the portion of the payments attribu-
table to trade secrets of the franchise fell outside § 1253.
152. Id. at 548 (citing Dairy Queen of Oklahoma, Inc. v. Commissioner, 250 F.2d 503
(10th Cir. 1957)).
153. The very distinctive legislative histories behind §§ 865 and 1253 explain my dif-
ferent solutions for each area. The § 865 legislative history highlights the inap-
propriateness of my § 1253 solution for the income sourcing difficulties. Scaling
back § 865(d)(2)’s U.S.-sourcing rule to just franchises would frustrate, rather
than further, the congressional goals. In contrast to § 1253’s legislative history,
§ 865(d)(2)’s legislative history evidences no specific focus on franchises. In fact,
as originally enacted, § 865(d)(2) did not even include franchises, an apparent
oversight which was corrected by the 1988 Act. See supra note 87.
154. See S. REP. NO. 91-552, at 210 (1969), as reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2027,
2245.
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trademarks.”155 And the Senate Report cites just a Dairy Queen
franchise case as support for the legislative change.156
2. Inconsistency and Practical Allocation Issues
Consider now the stated reason behind § 1253’s adverse treatment
of contingent payments. Returning to the legislative history, Congress
explained that annual contingent payments seem more akin to license
royalties than proceeds from the sale of property.157 Despite some ini-
tial appeal, § 1253’s negative treatment of contingent payments con-
tradicts the law for other property. For instance, the general
installment sale rules specify how to report (capital) gain from contin-
gent sales payments over time.158 More specifically, the tax law ex-
plicitly permits capital gains on earn outs for other intellectual
property like patents and copyrights.159  Deeper analysis thus uncov-
ers the inconsistency of § 1253’s automatic denial of capital gains for
contingent trademark payments. And linking back to the legislative
history analysis above,160 § 1253 targets trademark earn outs without
any explanation for this unequal harshness compared to copyrights
and patents.161
155. Id. at 207, as reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2241.
156. Id. at 208 n.1, as reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2242 n.62.
157. Id. at 208–09, as reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2243 (“It also would appear
that the receipt of contingent payments could be viewed as constituting a contin-
uing economic interest in the subject matter as well as being analogous to the
receipt of royalty or rental income.”). Note that royalties are taxed as ordinary
income as they lack the requisite sale or exchange for capital gain treatment. See
I.R.C. §§ 1(h), 1222 (2012).
158. An installment sale involves at least one deferred payment after the year of sale.
I.R.C. § 453(b)(1) (2012). Under a qualified installment sale, taxpayers generally
report a fixed proportion of each payment as gain based on a ratio of the total
gain to the total payments. § 453(c). This calculation is relatively straightforward
where the total payments are fixed. Special difficulties arise, however, where
some or all of the payments are contingent (as neither total gain nor total pay-
ments are determinable at the outset). Treas. Reg. § 15a.453–1(c) (1969) provides
a series of rules for contingent payments. The details of such rules are beyond the
scope of this paper as the mere presence of such rules suffices for our purpose. In
particular, the presence of § 15a.453–1(c) demonstrates how contingent pay-
ments generally do not negate a transaction which otherwise qualifies as a sale
for tax purposes.
159. See supra note 104. One might note that § 1235 is designed to encourage innova-
tion by providing taxpayer-friendly rules to patent inventors. See infra note 178.
But that cannot explain the adverse treatment of trademarks compared to copy-
rights (on contingent payments) as self-created copyrights receive tax-disfavored
treatment under § 1221(a)(3). See the discussion of § 1221(a)(3) (2012) supra note
118. For a prior commentary making a similar point, but only as to patents
(which arguably can be distinguished as noted right above), see Izzo, supra note
102, at 273.
160. See subsection III.B.1.
161. This taxpayer-adverse rule on contingent payments thus might be explained
more readily in the franchise context. By definition in the franchise context,
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This disparate treatment also raises serious practical issues on a
business sale. As developed previously, differential tax provisions
which require separate allocations between closely associated in-
tangibles are ripe with mischief. While not completely immune,
§ 1253’s application to “franchises” at least minimizes these concerns
due to the encapsulating nature of the franchise.162 But § 1253’s ap-
plication to non-franchise trademarks lacks any such saving grace,163
presenting the problematic scenario rejected by the recent § 367(d)
regulations.164
3. Subsequent Changes Leave One-Sided Punitive Regime
Section 1253 originally provided a balanced approach. As an offset
to the recipient’s ordinary income, the payer could deduct each year’s
contingent payment.165 But § 1253 now denies such deduction unless
transferors are splitting up their ownership interests. And this slicing up of own-
ership interests is another indicator of an ordinary income license rather than a
sale. Compare I.R.C. § 1253(b)(1) (2012) (“The term ‘franchise’ includes an agree-
ment which gives one of the parties to the agreement the right to distribute, sell,
or provide goods, services, or facilities, within a specified area.”), with Treas. Reg.
§ 1.1235-2(b)(1)(i) (as amended in 1980) (providing that a transfer of patent
rights “which is limited geographically within the country of issuance” fails the
§ 1235 “all substantial rights” requirement).
162. See supra notes 108–09 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 114–16 and accompanying text. As noted previously, BJ’s restau-
rant provides a good example of restaurant trademarks. See supra note 42. For
their disclaimer highlighting valuation difficulties on such trademarks, see BJ’S
RESTAURANTS, INC., FORM 10-K (2013), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/
1013488/000119312513074282/d447638d10k.htm#toc447638_24 [https://perma
.unl.edu/G8TS-C5SL] (“We believe that the trademarks, service marks and other
proprietary rights have significant value and are important to our brand-building
effort and the marketing of our restaurant concepts. However, there are other
restaurants and retailers that use the name ‘BJ’s’ in some form or fashion
throughout the United States. We have in the past protected, and expect and
intend to continue to vigorously protect, our proprietary rights. We cannot predict
whether steps taken by us to protect our proprietary rights will be adequate to
prevent misappropriation of these rights or the use by others of restaurant fea-
tures based upon, or otherwise similar to, our concept. It may be difficult for us to
prevent others from copying elements of our concept and any litigation to enforce
our rights will likely be costly.”). Note that BJ’s does not operate franchises as all
restaurants are company owned. See id.
164. As discussed throughout this section, I recommend deletion of trademarks from
§ 1253 for several reasons. With a focus on just this even-handed treatment
point, Congress alternatively could extend the ordinary income treatment for con-
tingent payments to all other intangibles. A broader perspective, though, coun-
sels in favor of curtailing, rather than extending, the adverse treatment of
contingent payments.
165. Thus, both sides were treated like a royalty license.  The Senate Report nicely
provides the balanced approach. S. REP. NO. 91-552, at 210 (1969), as reprinted in
1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2027, 2244 (“[T]he committee amendments . . . provide that all
amounts received or accrued by the transferor on account of a transfer, sale, or
other disposition of a franchise, trademark, or trade name, which are contingent
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the contingent payments continue for the full transfer term.166 Given
the unlimited duration of trademark legal rights, this often negates
such deduction (other than for limited-term licenses).167 Section 1253
thus now provides just a one-sided negative result to the seller on
transfers which otherwise qualify as a sale.168  Such inconsistency
on the productivity, use, or disposition of the franchise, trademark, or trade name
transferred are to be treated as ordinary income. Contingent payments would
include continuing payments . . . measured by a percentage of the selling price of
products marketed or based on the units manufactured or sold, or any other simi-
lar method based upon production, sale or use, or disposition of the franchise,
trademark, or trade name transferred.  The committee amendments also provide
that amounts paid or incurred during the taxable year on account of a transfer,
sale, or other disposition of a franchise, trademark, or trade name which are con-
tingent on the productivity, use, or disposition of the franchise, trademark, or
trade name transferred, are to be deductible by the transferee as trade or busi-
ness expenses.”).
166. See I.R.C. § 1253(d)(1)(B)(ii)(I) (2012). This includes any renewals. See
§ 1253(d)(3). The amendment was made in connection with the enactment of
§ 197. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66,
§ 13261(c), 107 Stat. 312, 532–40.
167. See JEFFREY MAINE & XUAN-THAO NGUYEN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY TAXATION:
PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS 147 (2d ed. 2015) (“[S]ection 1253(d)(1) applies mainly
to payments pursuant to licenses (and not sales) . . . .”) Since trademarks can
extend indefinitely, qualification would seem to require an agreement to pay the
contingent amounts in perpetuity. This would be contrary to the typical business
deal. See Cecila Jeong & Charmin Shiely, Getting the Purchase Price Right: Earn-
outs, Escrows, and Post-Closing Adjustments in M&A Transactions, SCHWABE,
WILLIAMSON & WYATT (Nov. 22, 2016), http://www.schwabe.com/newsroom-publi-
cations-14655 [http://perma.unl.edu/K7FP-NBSF] (“Most earn-out periods con-
clude after the expiration of a specified length of time—generally between two
and five years after the closing.”). But some deals are structured with royalties in
perpetuity, such as the classic sale by the owners of the Spirits of St. Louis, a
former American Basketball Association franchise. See Monte Burke, The NBA




168. Especially since substantial contingent payments can also taint fixed considera-
tion as ordinary, note how the original § 1253 also provided a payer benefit on the
fixed payments. At the time of the enactment of § 1253, § 197 was not on the
books yet, and so trademark payments generally were not depreciable due to
their lack of a useful life. Original § 1253(d)(2), though, provided some balance as
it allowed the payer to depreciate fixed payments over ten years. Once again, the
Senate Report nicely illustrates the balanced approach. S. REP. NO. 91-552, at
210 (1969), as reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2027, 2245 (“Where, however, the
agreement is not a sale under the committee amendments, then it is provided
that the transferee may deduct the initial payments over the period of the agree-
ment to which they are attributable but, in no event, over more than 10 taxable
years. This treatment is to apply in these cases to any payment, other than a
contingent payment, in discharge of a principal sum agreed upon in the transfer
agreement. Thus, in the case of a single payment, the transferee is to be allowed
to deduct the payment ratably over 10 years if the transfer agreement is for a
period of more than 10 years, or ratably over the period of agreement, if not more
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provides a net adverse impact on the collective parties to the transac-
tion, reinforcing the incentives to allocate away from the
trademark.169
4. Discontinuities in Trademark Litigation
Finally, an intriguing litigation case highlights additional difficul-
ties with the inclusion of trademarks under § 1253. In Inco Elec-
troenergy v. Commissioner,170 the taxpayer owned the trademark
EXIDE for use in its battery business and challenged Standard Oil’s
use of EXXON in any battery-related business. The parties ultimately
settled, with taxpayer receiving a $5,000,000 payment for dropping its
opposition to the EXXON use. The IRS challenged the taxpayer’s re-
porting of the settlement as capital gains. The court found in favor of
capital gains since the settlement was for damage to the “trademarks
and associated goodwill.” Interestingly, the court did not even mention
§ 1253; rather, it applied general tax principles for sales versus
licenses.171
than 10 years.”). But this beneficial aspect of § 1253 was eliminated with the
enactment of § 197, which allowed fifteen-year recovery to trademark payments
without regard to the recipient’s consequences.
169. This links back to subsection III.B.2, which discussed allocating towards assets
other than the trademark. Separately, an even-handed approach has several po-
tential benefits. For instance, adverse interests between the parties can help to
police the area as one side has an incentive to resist the other side’s tax-moti-
vated allocation. Also, perhaps somewhat related, favorable treatment on one
side can ameliorate harsh treatment on the other side as the parties can adjust
the purchase price for the tax benefits and detriments. In contrast, application of
the rules in the franchising context are more likely to provide balance given an
increased likelihood of ongoing payments for the full duration of the franchise.
See, e.g., Gowdey’s Estate v. Comm’r, 307 F.2d 816, 818 (4th Cir. 1962) (“Each
[transferee] paid Gowdey an immediate sum upon the execution of the agreement
and thereafter 35 cents per gallon on all mix used or sold within his territory.”).
170. 54 T.C.M. 359 (1987).
171. While the initial dispute started before the § 1253 enactment in 1969, the pay-
ment was not made until 1973. For one commentator’s linkage of the case to
§ 1253 (without further developing the § 1253 omission), see Ronald H. Jensen,
Can You Have Your Cake and Eat It Too?: Achieving Capital Gain Treatment
While Keeping the Property, 5 PITT. TAX REV. 75, 116–17 (2008) (“The $5,000,000
. . . may therefore be viewed as consideration for a transfer of an interest in the
Exide trademark to Standard Oil in which case it would qualify as long-term
capital gain. Standard Oil must have found substantial merit in taxpayer’s claim
that its Exide trademark included the right to use of the word ‘Exxon.’ Otherwise,
it would not have paid the taxpayer $5,000,000. Under the law then and now, a
transfer of an interest in a trademark will generally qualify for capital gain treat-
ment unless the transferor retains significant powers over the transferred inter-
est [under § 1253]. In the latter case, the transfer will be deemed a license and
payments received under it will be taxed as ordinary income. Although the court
did not pass on whether taxpayer had transferred an interest in its Exide trade-
mark to Standard Oil, it rejected the IRS’s contention that the settlement agree-
ment was a mere license.” (citations omitted)).
920 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96:883
This omission raises open interpretative issues. For instance,
would the court have reached the same result even after explicit con-
sideration of § 1253?172 Perhaps, as the fixed amount did not violate
the contingent payment aspects discussed above. But § 1253(a) also
provides for ordinary income treatment “if the transferor retains any
significant power, right, or continuing interest.”173 And the case in-
volved a transfer of much less than the owner’s full interest as the
owner retained its EXIDE trademark for its own use going forward. A
§ 1253 analysis plausibly could have gone either way. As evidenced by
the franchise definition, § 1253 contemplates the possibility of split-
interest transfers qualifying for capital gains so long as all other crite-
ria are satisfied.174 On the other hand, § 1253’s legislative history
linked trademarks to the § 1235 patent standard requiring a “transfer
of all substantial rights.”175 And the § 1235 regulations now prohibit
retentions for patents of the sort seen in the Inco case.176
172. In addition, query whether § 1253 applies to just the separately determinable
trademark value or include the entire settlement amount (including the associ-
ated goodwill). The Syncsort decision would suggest the latter. See Syncsort Inc.
v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 545 (1994); supra note 151.
173. I.R.C. § 1253(a) (2012).
174. See § 1253(b)(1) (“The term ‘franchise’ includes an agreement which gives one of
the parties to the agreement the right to distribute, sell, or provide goods, ser-
vices, or facilities, within a specified area.” (emphasis added)).
175. H.R. REP. NO. 99-782, at 394 (1969) (Conf. Rep.) (“Your committee’s bill provides
an exception to the general rule. Under this exception, the general rule is not to
apply with respect to amounts received or accrued, in connection with a transfer
of a franchise, which are attributable to the transfer of all substantial rights to a
patent, trademark, or trade name (or the transfer of an undivided interest
therein which includes part of all such rights), to the extent the amounts are
separately identified and are reasonable in amount. These amounts, as is the
case with the transfer of a patent under section 1235, would be entitled to capital
gains treatment.”).
176. Transfers fail § 1235’s “all substantial rights” requirement if they grant rights
“limited geographically within the country of issuance” or “in fields of use within
trades or industries, which are less than all the rights covered by the patent,
which exist and have value at the time of the grant”; or “less than all the claims
or inventions covered by the patent which exist and have value at the time of the
grant.” Treas. Reg. § 1.1235–2(b)(1)(i), (iii)–(iv) (as amended in 1980). Further
note how § 1253 does provide additional hurdles for capital gains above and be-
yond the general tax principles used by the Inco Electroenergy court. Note that
§ 1253(a) has open-ended possibilities apart from the enumerated list in
§ 1253(b). For one commentator’s take that geographic divisions are problematic
under the more stringent § 1253 standards, see Izzo supra note 102, at 269–70
(“Transfers that are limited as to geographic scope . . . are considered licenses, not
sales. . . . In a geographically limited transfer, the seller takes his interest and
splits it into two parts, retaining one part for himself, and transferring the other
part to the buyer. For example, the seller could transfer to the buyer the exclu-
sive right to use the trademark east of the Mississippi River. He thus would be
reserving rights in the western half of the country to himself. This would clearly
be divisive. . . . A division necessarily implies a retention of a significant right
[within the meaning of § 1253] on the part of the seller.”).
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In any event, the lingering uncertainty about these questions lends
further support to excising trademarks from the § 1253 franchise-de-
signed rules. In this regard, the Inco Electroenergy court capably re-
solved the capital gains issue under general tax principles without the
need for additional § 1253 principles.177
5. Summary
For all the foregoing reasons, Congress should remove trademarks
from § 1253. Congressional concern over split-interest franchises jus-
tified the anti-capital gains approach of § 1253. Despite significant re-
tentions, some courts validated the questionable capital gains claims
of franchisors. This reasoning does not extend to business transfers
involving trademarks outside the franchise context. In addition, devel-
opments over time have shown the practical difficulties for these non-
franchise transfers. As such, the current inclusion of all trademarks in
§ 1253 fails on both theoretic and practical grounds.
C. Business Sale Override of §§ 1221(a)(3) and 1235
As noted above in subsection III.C.2, §§ 1221(a)(3) and 1235 pro-
vide varying capital gain rules for the sale of copyrights and patents.
While a specific Congressional policy goal supports these disparate
rules,178 their joint operation on a business sale creates difficult allo-
cation issues.179 Fortunately, an existing statutory provision again
provides the tried and tested pathway to reform. As discussed above,
the buyer depreciates intangibles over a uniform fifteen-year period
on a business acquisition. In essence, § 197 sets aside the specialized
depreciations rules for patents and copyrights on business acquisi-
tions. But the specialized depreciations rules remain intact for sepa-
rately acquired patents or copyrights.180 As discussed above, the
desire to avoid messy allocation issues motivated this dual approach,
distinguishing business and separate acquisitions.
In similar fashion, the specialized §§ 1221(a)(3) and 1235 rules can
remain intact for separately sold copyrights and patents. But Con-
gress should implement a newly crafted exception from those sections
177. This neatly takes us back to the start of this section regarding the legislative
history. Section 1253 was enacted in response to the courts’ inability to satisfacto-
rily resolve capital gain issues in the franchise context. As discussed supra notes
155–56 and accompanying text, the legislative history is noticeably devoid of any
troubling trademark cases outside the franchise context.
178. For instance, § 1235 was enacted to encourage innovative patent developments.
S. REP. NO. 83-1622, at 439 (1969), as reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4621,
5082–83. This rationale was not extended to copyright development.
179. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
180. As discussed supra note 30 and accompanying text, § 197(e)(4)(C) provides that
patents and copyrights are subject to § 197 only if acquired as part of a trade or
business.
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for copyrights and patents sold as part of a business. The regular capi-
tal gains rules would then apply uniformly to intellectual property
sold as part of a business.181
V. CONCLUSION
The recent tax bill counteracted taxpayer goodwill hunting on for-
eign-subsidiary transfers through a simple change to a Tax Code defi-
nition.182 In the same spirit, another easy definitional fix would just
remove trademarks from § 1253. The section’s harsh contingent-pay-
ment rules then would apply to just the real Congressional target:
split-interest franchises. In this regard, the limited nature of a
franchise transfer helps to justify § 1253’s capital gains override. In
addition, franchises tend to subsume all business goodwill, thereby
avoiding the troublesome allocation issues imbedded in non-franchise
trademark transfers. Such trademark deletion also would address un-
necessary discontinuities and interpretative issues, especially regard-
ing trademark-litigation proceeds.
The remaining two solutions then favorably draw upon other ex-
isting provisions. While the § 1253 change above would address trade-
mark-allocation disputes, similar issues plague copyrights and
patents given §§ 1221(a)(3)’s and 1235’s specialized capital gains
rules. These seller’s-side allocation issues invoke the pre-1993 law for
buyers. This inverse recognition then uncovers the straightforward
correction. Similar to § 197, the seller-side rules should apply uni-
formly to all intangibles on a business sale. Congress could just pro-
vide a new exception from §§ 1221(a)(3) and 1235 for copyrights and
patents sold as part of a business, leaving those provisions in place for
separately sold copyrights and patents.183
Finally, the desirable § 865 reform likewise utilizes existing
law.184 Goodwill currently serves as a proxy for the foreign taxation of
intangibles gain.185 However, time has shown the problems with this
181. This assumes that Congress also would excise trademarks from § 1253, as pro-
posed above. Note that the separately acquired distinction would not make sense
for trademarks since trademarks typically implicate the sale of a business. Treas.
Reg. §1.197–2(e)(2)(i) (as amended in 2017).
182. See supra section III.A.
183. As discussed supra note 30 and accompanying text, § 197 treats separately ac-
quired patents and copyrights differently from those acquired as part of a trade
or business. See also I.R.C. § 197(e)(4) (2012) (exempting certain intangibles “not
acquired in a transaction . . . involving the acquisition of assets constituting a
trade or business” from the fifteen-year depreciation rules).
184. As discussed supra note 146, usage of proven approaches counteracts the status
quo bias against change.
185. See supra note 124.
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proxy use of goodwill.186 Fortunately, other developments have shown
the ability to directly target the ultimate goal. Treaty-based sourcing
rules now link right to the actual foreign taxation of the income. Im-
portantly, these elective rules contain a viable anti-avoidance mecha-
nism: a quid pro quo agreement to apply the foreign tax credit
limitation separately to the elected foreign-source income. With the
reform pathway already cleared, Congress can readily extend this
tried and tested treaty approach to all intangibles gain.187 Utilization
of this proven structure neutralizes the status quo bias against unt-
ested proposals.
With these changes,188 Congress would complete the worthwhile
exercise undertaken in the foreign-subsidiary context. Trademarks
typically generate positive consumer sentiments, creating the usual
association of trademarks with goodwill.189 But so-called badwill
arises instead when the association with the trademark turns nega-
tive.190 The proposed legislative changes here would eradicate the
current “badwill hunting” association under the tax law and restore
the appropriate “good” back into the positive goodwill attribute.191
186. See the incisive quote from the recent preamble to the § 367 regulations supra
note 65 and accompanying text.
187. See supra note 147 and accompanying text for the specifics of this change.
188. While this Article advocates for all of these changes, the independence of each
change is another virtue. One particular change could be dropped, for instance, if
the political process generated pushback in that area.
189. See supra notes 89–95 and accompanying text.
190. Aaron Perzanowski, Unbranding, Confusion, and Deception, 24 HARV. J. L. &
TECH. 1, 10 (2010) (“[J]ust as brands can function as repositories of consumer
goodwill, reflecting favorable public sentiment, they can also represent badwill,
negative associations in the minds of consumers.”); id. at 10 n.46 (“One way to
conceptualize negative brand equity is to ask whether a consumer would prefer
an unknown brand to a familiar one. A consumer who prefers a brand about
which she has no information, other factors being equal, regards the known
brand as a disincentive to purchase.”); Randall B. Wilhite, The Effect of Goodwill
in Determining the Value of a Business in a Divorce, 35 FAM. L.Q. 351, 353 n.11
(2001) (“A business might suffer from ‘bad will’ or . . . ‘negative goodwill’ . . . when
the elements of a company come together and produce profits lower than what
the same elements could produce separately. . . . There are some examples in
Wall Street lore where ‘corporate raiders’ have bought a company, only to liqui-
date it on the notion that it is worth more dead than alive. Such a company is
said to have had ‘negative goodwill.’ ”); Note, Badwill, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1845,
1852–54 (2003).
191. Recall how goodwill generally references a business’s positive reputation.
